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My interest in information technology can be traced back many years when even at
a very young age I was interested in electronics, computers and programming. As a
graduate from a technical high school, a BSc in Electrical Engineering and current
master student in Computer Technology at Vienna University of Technology and
also from some work experience I gained lots of insight into information technology,
probably more than most other economists were able to.
But also for pure economists information technology became very interesting in
recent years: Information technology usually provides companies huge economies
of scale. Information technology facilitates what is called network economies such
that consumers gain welfare by the number of other consumers buying the same
good, meaning that there are lock-in eects, learning eects, \platform problems"
and much more. Some companies became blue prints for the economics of compe-
tition (policy) and innovation. And: There are a number of extremely successful
companies, making huge prots, some already for decades but some just for very
few years and many of the most successful ones are still growing.
The topic I want to do my research on is what I call \openness", a term that will
be dened in more detail below. In my denition openness is a general term for
topics in information technology for which a company or other organization allows
access in some way to it's developments. In this work the goal is to scrutinize
the properties of openness and how this relates to competition in the information
technology industry.
The major research questions therefore are the following:
1. How can openness be dened in a general way and how do the dierent topics
t into this approach? Are there commonalities between the dierent topics?
2. How do successful companies use openness in their strategies and how is this
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related to their success?
3. How can openness be modeled reasonably such that the features of the in-
dustry are reected? What are the major issues and features of openness in
economic terms?
The thesis is organized as follows: After the introduction there is a section in
which I want to discuss important terms related to the topic and put them into a
historical perspective. I will discuss information technology, it's economic features
and where it came from, I will show why software is important and dene openness
and the topics that are related to openness as a general term. Then, in section 3 I
review related work by other authors that deal with parts of my research questions
or are in other ways related to my analysis. In section 4 I do an in-depth analysis
into the market for information technology by going into the details of the history,
strategies, products and legal issues of three very successful but however very
unique companies (Microsoft, Google and Apple) and work out how they deal with
openness in their strategies and history. An economic analysis follows in section 5:
I develop a 4-stage model that combines network economics with a vertical product
dierentiation approach in a leader-follower market and discuss the properties of
the model. I further show that several topics of openness can be discussed using
the model by changing certain details and solve the model for the issues at hand.
In section 6 the research questions will be revisited again to summerize the results
and discuss possible extensions to the analysis.
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2. Denitions and Historical Perspective
2.1. Information Technology
Information technology is a term that is very often used today and seems to be
a public word for some time now. John (2001, p.2) states that the term is known
at least since 1958: Back then the term was needed "to describe the changes in
business management that would accompany the widespread adoption of the com-
puter\. This is of course not a real denition for the term but just a description of
how the term evolved. The discussion in this introduction by John is not about the
term information technology but rather a discussion if today we live in an informa-
tion age or not. He cites several authors that convincingly argue that information
has been very important in the history of humanity and this is not tied to the
modern age. Therefore, one could also go back to the 17th century as a start of
the information age, maybe even back to the ancient Greeks.
Searching for a straight denition for the term information technology gives lots
of dierent results. The most convenient I found was "the branch of engineering
that deals with the use of computers and telecommunications to retrieve and store
and transmit information\ (WordNet 3.0, n.d.). The denition is quite modern in a
sense because computers are explicitely mentioned. This also shows that historical-
ly it was in fact computer technology that boosted information technology. Haigh
(2001) shows how the connection between information and the computer worked:
Instead of just using computers as machines to process data, the idea in the 1950s
and 1960s was to have a managerial information system: Having a computer as an
information processing tool for business people and managers. Although at that
time it was not possible to build a so called MIS (totally integrated management
information system), the visions led to the understanding of a computer as the
main part of an information system.
The computer then not only became a vital part in dealing with information: The
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progress in computer technology and manufacturing was also the reason for the
boom in information technology in the last decades. Starting from basic inven-
tions like the transistor in 1947 or the integrated circuit in 1959, the progress
in computer technology is linked to a technology prediction from 1965 nowadays
called Moore's law: Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel predicted that the num-
ber of transistors in an integrated circuit would double roughly every two years
without higher costs (Moore, 1965)(Intel, n.d.). In the last 50 years at least this
proposition held true and this allowed an exponential growth in processing speed,
memory capacity, sensor capability while chip size became smaller and smaller.
Those advancements led to a stream of better and more powerful products that
even became cheaper over time due to economies of scale: In these industries we
nd large one-time investments (R&D, production sites) but very low marginal
costs: Building a plant in 2009 costed about 4.2 billion dollars (Globalfoundries,
2009) while the production costs of a single modern processor is very low (there is
unfortunately no good data for it).
2.2. Software
One concept that has to be understood is software with it's distinction to hardware
(the actual physical device). Software can be dened as "written programs or
procedures or rules and associated documentation pertaining to the operation of
a computer system and that are stored in read/write memory\ (WordNet 3.0,
n.d.). This is maybe not a very clear denition but the most important part is in
it: It is about the actual operation of a computer system. Today, there are many
dierent types of software: Operating systems, drivers, rmware, databases and of
course application software. The main feature of software is that a developer can
provide functionality more easily than in hardware due to the use of programming
languages, APIs (Application Programming Interface) and compilers. One can also
argue that software provides a higher abstraction level to the computer system than
hardware. Cortada (2002) provides a starting point to the research on history of
software and software engineering. He argues that the basics of software design and
9
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development have been laid in the 1960s and are still important today: "between
50 and 75 percent of the largest companies in any US industry used computers
by 1969\ (Cortada, 2002, p.73). The following rise of the importance of software
is closely connected to the history of Microsoft and other companies in the 1980s
which will be discussed in later sections.
2.3. Openness
I do not know of any generally accepted denition so I will dene it in my own
terms and explain it's relation to topics in information technology. My denition
however is inuenced by an article by Pontin (2009) although I want to be more
precise in the denition and the relationships of the dierent aspects of openness.
Open Source is the one topic that maybe most people who are aware of the concept
of openness might think of rst (Open Source Initiative, n.d.). Here, the source
code of a program is not only freely available but usually also allowed to be copied,
changed and redistributed in a new product depending on the actual license. There
are many dierent licenses available today, some that force a redistribution in the
same license while others even allow the use of the source in commercial products.
Some enforce the shipment of the source code with the product while others don't.
Important licenses are the GPL (GNU General Public License), Apache License
and the BSD (Berkeley Software Distribution) License among others. Sometimes
those licenses are compatible so that a code in one license can be used in a code
of another license and sometimes they are not. Given the more general approach
of this thesis, the actual dierences in the details will not matter in this work.
Today there are several very successful products that are developed as open sour-
ce, for example the Linux operating systems, the Apache webserver, several web
browsers, databases and many, many more software products for smaller tasks.
Lerner and Tirole (2002) argue that the history of free software started in 1983
with the development of GNU by Richard Stallman and others due to the fact
that AT&T started to enforce it's property rights on UNIX. UNIX then was the
10
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most important branch of operating systems and was developed in the 1960s and
1970s in a cooperative way by academic institutions and other research facilities.
Although they do not explicitely mention it, the coming of all the commercial
operating systems in this time may also have played a role (see later for details
when I discuss the role and history of Microsoft).
The second important aspect of openness is compatibility. A compatible system
is a system that can work together with other systems or can work on or be
part of dierent other systems. In economic terms this can be often interpreted as
substitutability: A compatible system is often an alternative to an already existing
system. Sometimes compatibility is seen from the perspective of an incumbent who
might want to block a competitor to develop a compatible system for example by
using patents. Compatibility is an issue that in terms of information technology
can be divided into at least three dierent subissues:
1. Standards are formalizations of codes, methods, procedures, units - basically
ways of doing engineering. A standard can be open in two ways: It can
be openly documented which means that the documentation is available
to the public or it can be openly implemented, meaning that everybody
can use the standard (Valimaki, 2010). There are many institutions that
collect and certify standards like the ISO (International Organization for
Standardization) but standards can also be implicit for example due to a
monopoly which enforces it's use. If a standard is not open it is either held
secret or the implementation is protected by patents. An open standard can
facilitate compatibility as it provides guidelines how to develop compatible
systems.
2. Portability means that a software can work on several dierent operating
systems or that an operating systems can work on several hardware plat-
forms or that web sites can be shown on dierent web browsers and so on. A
more general and partly economic denition is given by Mooney (2008): "An
application is portable across a class of environments to the degree that the
eort required to transport and adapt it to a new environment in the class is
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less than the eort of redevelopment.\. In the last 30 years there was a lot of
convergence in operating system platforms as well as in hardware platforms,
meaning that it should become easier and less costly to provide portability.
While in the beginning of the 1980s there were many operating systems with
not much market share (see discussion in the section about Microsoft), to-
day there are basically just three: Microsoft's Windows, Apples MacOS and
Linux. Other Unix-type operating systems like Solaris, Novell Netware, HP
UX and IBM's OS/2 and z/OS just play a role in special purpose and lar-
ge server systems. In hardware, the personal computer market is dominated
by the IBM platform and Apples system although the latter one is not so
much dierent from the rst (see the section about Apple for discussion). For
smartphones or other low energy and mobile devices the ARM platform is
very dominant. Other platforms like IBM's PowerPC and Cell, Suns SPARC
or MIPS also just play a role in special purpose computers, high performance
computing, large server systems and gaming consoles. In the last 15 years
many innovations were made to make portability easier to achieve: For ex-
ample Java, Flash or browser applications allow the development of portable
software that works on any operating system. Hardware virtualization like
for example by VMware, Parallels or Xen (open source) in principle allow
the use of any operating system on any hardware platform and also the
"transferability\ of certain operating system installations between dierent
computers. Microsoft builds virtualization into it's operating systems such
that applications that were developed for older versions of Windows can still
be run on newer versions.
3. Interfaces are parts of a system that allow connections to other systems,
hardware or software1. The interesting types of interfaces for this thesis are
software interfaces which can be interfaces of an operating system that an
application software uses or it can be an interface that a software provides
for another software. Openness now means that like for standards the inter-
1The way a program or a computer as a whole presents itself to the user is also an interface,
ttingly called user interface. This however has completely dierent features than the interface
that connects software.
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faces are documented and that there are no patents preventing the use of an
interface. Many times interfaces are implicitely or explicitely standardized
but it still makes sense to mention it separately from standards. Operating
systems interfaces allow the use of services that an operating system pro-
vides to be used by application software, for example network transfer, le
handling, memory management, window management or the use of input
devices. Those are usually open via an API (Application Programming In-
terface) because otherwise writing software on an operating system would be
very dicult and inecient. Interfaces of an application software are usually
used for communication and data transfer between applications, for example
a database has an interface to obtain data, or communication software has
an interface to which another communication software can connect to or a
program reads data in a certain format from an input le which may have
been written by another program2.
A third aspect that I believe has to be included is licensing: A rm is open in
terms of licensing when it grants competitors the right to use it's technology. This
does not mean that the license has to be for free but that a choice is available for
other companies. One example might be an operating system that can be licensed
to other computer vendors to use the system. Another one where one company
allows another company to use part of it's chip design3. This of course deals with
issues like patents but also has to do with closed standards: A company with a
superior technology and an implicitely dened closed standard could either open up
by opening the standard or by licensing the standard (knowledge and/or patents)
to a competitor.
And then there are also more subtopics that I want to mention quickly:
• Open Data means that a company that deals and collects information allows
2There can be of course a debate whether input les are a part of the software and therefore no
interface to the outside world or if they are something from the outside that an application
has to be able to deal with via an input interface. In this thesis it makes more sense to assume
the second.
3This is the business plan for ARM processors.
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others (users, competitors) to manage that information.
• Open Access is a way to publish information (usually online) that everyone
can read, process and use.
• Reusability means that old products or parts of products can be used in
the development of new products. This is clearly the case in open source
development where anyone can just use code from another product as long
as the license criteria are met. However, the issue is not related to open source
in general as code reusability is also possible for closed source software.
Openness is therefore a very broad term that unites several subtopics that can
be interesting for economists. To summerize all in a formal denition is quite
hard and probably not even necessary but it is clear that openness means that
an external access to a certain development is allowed by the holder of rights to
that development. This can be access to code (open source, reusability), access to
interfaces, standards or documentation (compatibility), access to use, customize





Surveying economic literature that is related to my research questions I got the
impression that not very much has been done in this eld and the literature is
scattered along dierent topics that are all related to mine but are clearly not
seen in the same generality. To summerize and discuss those works I group them
according to the relation to my thesis.
3.1. Open Source
There are two important papers by Lerner and Tirole (2002, 2005) that deal with
the economics of open source and the background and reasons for the success of
open source development in recent years: The diusion of open source products,
the signicant capital investments by companies in open source and the new orga-
nizational structure of those projects. The interesting question that is asked is the
following: "Why should thousands of top-notch programmers contribute freely to
the provision of a public good?" (Lerner and Tirole, 2002, p.198).
The authors discuss several possibilities of those incentives, from altruism, to the
search for external or personal benets like future job opportunities (signaling
incentives), better future access to the capital market, ego gratication or peer
recognition. Benets for a rm having employees work on open-source projects
include higher motivation and improvements that can also be used in the primary
(closed-source) projects although there is of course also a cost involved that some
work time is lost for other projects. They also argue that companies can earn
o open source by selling complementary products or even release it's products
as open source especially if the product is not very protable as closed source
anyway.
From their studies of certain projects and the open source community they nd
15
3.1 Open Source 3 RELATED WORK
that those incentives really play a role in open source development: Many open
source projects were started due to insuciency of closed source software and the
inability to change this insuciency, giving a direct return to the development
that is greater than it's possible commercial usefulness. Also signaling incentives
play a role which can be seen by the fact that giving credit to the author(s) is very
important in the community and is enforced by several open source licenses. There
is also a lot of evidence that contributors for certain open source projects were hired
by commercial companies for their expertise and also open source success helped
many new companies to get access to the capital market.
Another topic is the question about the relative quality of open source. There are
arguments that open source has higher quality for consumers because they are
able to adapt and even improve the product for their needs. Another hypothesis
is that the open source process might lead to better quality because there is more
peer review and even more honest review in the open source scene than in closed
source developments. One argument that closed source development might lead to
better quality is the assumption that in open source development documentation
and user interfaces do not play a great role while those aspects are necessary for
closed source commercial products.
Another issue the papers deal with is about social welfare of open source develop-
ments. They cite several papers and conclude that there is not a clear eect in one
direction. The most interesting arguments are: Open source developments might
bring down prices for closed source products which might lead to higher welfare
but competing systems (for example operating systems) might lead to lower value
of systems when less applications are available on one system. There might also
be a negative innovation eect when open source software brings down prots for
closed software and therefore lowers investments for innovations in that area. Open
source might also have a positive impact on human capital.
Also an interesting contribution is the relationship between software patents and
open source. The authors argue that patents are especially problematic for open
source development as those can hardly pay royalty fees to patent holders and
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also do not have a defensive portfolio of patents. They also nd initiatives in the
open source world to insure projects against patent risks and clarications in the
open source licenses that prevent the shipment of open source products that are
restricted by patents.
3.2. Network Eects and Compatibility Decisions
There is a strong literature on Network Economics and the most notable textbook
seems to be the one by Shy (2004). Most related to my thesis are the rst two
chapters, dealing with the hardware and the software industry. The models that
are developed in this book about network eects all deal with the question of
compatibility of products which is one of the subtopics of openness. In the software
chapter Shy develops a combined hardware-software model where consumers value
hardware systems and software variety. As the oered software variety depends on
the number of consumer who buy the hardware system this constitutes a network
model and a compatibility analysis in a duopoly market follows. However, I am
not very satised with the Untercut-Proof-Equilibrium approach and therefore did
not base my analysis on that type of model.
There is also a paper by Church and Gandal (1992) that studies network eects
of complementary products like hardware/software, operating systems/software or
video game hardware/software and standardization. They argue that a hardware
platform cannot be sold when there is no complementary software for that hard-
ware and that software is not interoperable so that it can only be used on the
platform it is developed for. Furthermore, there are two dierent hardware plat-
forms, consumers who value variety and an exogenous number of software rms
that have to decide for which platform to develop software (they cannot develop
for both).
The authors show that there are two eects that point into dierent directions:
The network eect makes a platform more valuable for a software rm when there
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are already many rms providing software for that platform because this leads to
higher hardware sales and a bigger market for it's software products. On the other
hand, the competitive eect makes a platform less attractive when there are more
software rms on one platform because the rms compete against each other and
(holding hardware sales constant) the prot goes down the more rms are on that
platform.
Depending on the parameters of the model two equilibria are possible: One where
just one platform survives, all the rms provide software for that platform and there
is de facto standardization in hardware and another one where both platforms
survive and software is provided for both platforms. A welfare analysis shows
that the latter one might be the equilibrium even for parameters where it would
be optimal to have just one platform. The model is very interesting because it
combines hardware and software markets and gives a clue how those interact.
A dierent idea is presented in the paper by Arthur (1989) that shows that in
a model with technology adoption and increasing returns there is a possibility
of adoption of an inferior (long-run) technology if it gains an early lead. Historic
events and lock-in are important in this kind of setting. The paper studies a timing
model where agents choose a technology at specic points in time. The choice
depends on preferences but for increasing returns also on the number of agents
who already adopted the respective technology. If a sucient number of agents
adopted a technology then no agent that comes later chooses another technology
even if it preferred that technology when there were no network eects4. The
equilibrium is a state where all market share goes to one technology although it is
not clear which technology will dominate.
Baake and Boom (2001) analyze a 4-stage game combining a vertical product
dierentiation and network economics model where consumers value a product by
both it's inherent quality and it's network size. Here, rms rst choose the product
quality they want to oer, then decide on whether to install an adapter to make the
4It is interesting that the author actually never calls it \network eect" but \increasing returns
in adoption."
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product compatible to the other product, and after a price competition consumers
decide which product to buy (if any). The authors show that in equilibrium, there
is always the decision for an adapter and this is also welfare enhancing in this
model. However, the model is quite complex as for certain parameter combinations
multiple equilibria can occur in the consumer stage while there are many dierent
solutions for equilibria in the pricing stage. This model is symmetric in the sense
that both rms enter the market at the same time, although in equilibrium the




In this section I want to do a comprehensive study on the three most successful
and recognizable companies in information technology. I study the history of those
companies, their products and their strategies with respect to openness in all it's
facets: Microsoft, Apple and Google. Of course there are many more successful
companies in information technology and all of them have a certain strategy on
openness. IBM, Oracle or Intel might come to mind immediately and I do not
reject that it might have been interesting to study those as well. However, it seems
more useful to study less companies in more detail than the other way round and
furthermore those three companies already show almost all possible strategies with
respect to openness.
The rst company I want to study is Microsoft, one of the most successful and
protable companies in the world. There are of course many books about Microsoft
and it's history but I will primarely stick to a study by Campbell-Kelly (2001),
Microsoft's own history timetable (Microsoft, 2004), the database of The History of
Computing Project (n.d.) and Microsoft's product web page and documentation.
The second rm in this analysis is Apple, a rm known today for it's great pro-
tability, it's design and product quality. Although the beginning of the company
seems to be similar to Microsoft's in some aspects, the strategies, product decisi-
on, rm culture and business success were not. I primarily used the book by Linz-
mayer (2004), an in-depth article by Goodell (1996), interesting facts and essays at
The Apple Museum (Mesa, n.d.) and information found at www.apple-history.com
(Sanford, n.d.).
The third company is relatively young compared to the other two and came up
when the others already were big companies and were going through ups and downs
as well as dierent environments. Google is a child of the Internet age and became
big when the Internet became more and more important. My main sources for the
part about Google are it's own quite detailed corporate timeline (Google, n.d.a)
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and a book by Vise (2008).
Of course, the product documentations of several products of those companies as
well as my own knowledge and experience play a role, too. Certainly, this study
cannot be complete but it is a summary about what I think are the most important
aspects of those companies in relation to my research questions.
4.1. Microsoft
4.1.1. History and Rise
Microsoft was founded in 1975 by Bill Gates and Paul Allen, it's rst customer
being MITS which back then produced the Altair 8800, the rst personal com-
puter in history, and Microsoft wrote some programming language (BASIC) for
it. Selling it's product also to other vendors Microsoft was rst a programming
language company before making the decision to also go into operating systems
and later application software. The company became Microsoft Incorporation by
1981 with the success story also beginning in that year, with IBM's presentation
of it's personal computer and Microsoft's decision to focus primarely on the de-
velopment of an operating system (and other products) for that platform. When
IBM brought it's PC to the market, it consisted of an Intel processor (8086) and
licensed several dierent operating systems that could be purchased together with
the PC5. Although being just one of several operating systems oered by IBM for
it's PC MS-DOS (Microsoft Disk Operating System) was the one to come out the
most successful. Campbell-Kelly (2001) argues that it was not the best system but
it was the one that was available already when IBM introduced the PC and also
5It is interesting that IBM which then was by far the most powerful company in the computer
industry did not develop and sell it's own operating system as this type of bundling was com-
mon back then (Fisher, 2000). One reason might have been that IBM was tried by antitrust
authorities in the United States due to it's bundling behavior but it also might have been
due to a problem with the development schedule of the PC not allowing the development of
an "IBM operating system for the IBM PC\.
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the one with the best price. The awesome growth of Microsoft in the 1980s with
revenues growth of 36% or more every year was clearly due to it's success with IBM
type PCs of which about 90% sold were equipped with a version of MS-DOS and
over 80% of sold PCs were of the IBM type by the end of the decade. Microsoft's
operating systems made about a half of the yearly revenues of the company during
that time.
The question is of course why no other company was able to challenge Microsoft's
position in such a protable business, especially as the earlier versions of MS-DOS
were not that sophisticated (even the second version in 1983 had just about 20,000
lines of code). And then, even people at Microsoft might not have believed that MS-
DOS was able to stay successful as they also bought a UNIX license from AT&T
and wanted to develop a UNIX-style operating system called XENIX to become
the future standard. Furthermore, one can argue that MS-DOS wasn't even the
best operating systems for much of the time as in the beginning it lacked network
capabilities, concurrent operation and a graphical user interface. Campbell-Kelly
shows that there was a competition by up to 20 vendors oering operating systems
during that time and still, nobody was able to beat out Microsoft. There are many
reasons one can attribute to this success:
• The economics of increasing returns where the largest rm is also the most
protable. Microsoft had huge prots which were invested in making the
product better and get into other markets as well (see below).
• The rst mover advantage on the IBM platform.
• Lock-in eects where users were used to the system and faced switching costs.
• Network eects: Most applications are written for the most used operating
system to have a greater potential market for the product. This in turn
strengthens the dominant platform because some customers might not be
able to use a needed application on another platform.
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The problem that the standard in operating systems (MS-DOS) did not have
the ability for concurrent operation of several programs and also no graphical
interface was starting to be solved just a few years after the IBM platform was
introduced. The solution was a windowing system which today of course is the
standard for PCs: Several applications run in dierent windows concurrently and
one can use a mouse to work with those windows. The idea came from Xerox
already in the 1970s but the Xerox Star which was already introduced in 1981
was a commercial failure due to it's huge price ($40,000). The same is true for the
Apple product Lisa which was introduced in 1983 but it also was too expensive
for commercial success ($16,995). The Apple Macintosh from 1984 was a lot more
successful due to it's more modest price ($2,500) and was able to get about 5 to
10% of market share in personal computers in the 1980s (see the section about
Apple). The approach for the IBM platform was to not get rid of MS-DOS and
develop a new system but to develop a graphical system on top of MS-DOS, as a
layer between the operating system and the applications. Even some competitors
in that time used MS-DOS as basis for their own operating system. This was of
course also the approach that Microsoft took when announcing the development
of a product called Windows in 1983. Although the computer world expected the
windowing systems to become standard by 1984, all the approaches back then
were commercial failures. Campbell-Kelly attributes this to the fact that the Intel
processors were not fast enough at that time which made the windowing systems
hard to use and customers sticked with the textual interfaces.
For Microsoft the problem was not that big though as it still had it's revenues
from MS-DOS which were not threatened and it still worked on improving the
Windows system in the background. In 1985 it also started a joint venture with
IBM to develop OS/2 which was intended to eventually succeed MS-DOS as a
standard operating system on the IBM platform. Although this also became a
commercial op when the product was nished OS/2 should become important
for Microsoft later. The reasons for the op were the higher price, the relatively
modest improvements over the then-current MS-DOS version and the incompati-
bility with application software written for MS-DOS. Microsoft dropped out of the
arrangement with IBM later which improved and sold the product further although
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with very modest success. Microsoft's versions of Windows on the other hand were
compatible to MS-DOS, were improved rapidly and with the third major release
in 1990 nally became a commercial success. The reason for success clearly was
the fact that MS-DOS and it's huge base of application software could still be used
while the graphical user interface of Windows was modern, more convenient to use
and more ecient.
Another success story apart from the market of operating system was Microsoft's
developments of so called productivity applications like Word and Excel. In con-
trast to it's success in operating systems Microsoft did not have any rst mover
advantage, instead there were already strong incumbents (Lotus 1-2-3, WordPer-
fect, dBase) in the market when developments of those products were started
(1980). Although some of the products were launched in 1982 and lot of money
was put into their development the productivity applications did not become a
commercial success initially as the incumbents were too strong and their products
very well established. The very interesting strategic decision for Microsoft then
was to switch the platform: It decided to release and improve the products not for
the IBM but for the Apple platform, gaining experience and a dominant market
position in the latter while still providing the dominant operating system for the
former. The success then came in the late 1980s and 1990 at the same time as
the rst success with Windows. For those platforms Microsoft had a rst mover
advantage and was also able to integrate the software very well into the Windows
user interface. What helped even more was that the incumbents still believed that
IBM's OS/2 would become the platform of the future such that they did not put
enough resources in the development of Windows versions of their products. When
they nally were able to bring around a version for Windows 3.0 Microsoft was
already in a great position and won a huge market share, for example a share of
70% in spreadsheet applications or 90% in word processor application by 1995.
The success was even enhanced by Microsoft in 1990 with a new marketing stra-
tegy: Instead of selling every product at once, Microsoft also sold the package
including every productivity application at a price that was very close to what a
buyer then had to pay for one rival product alone. Although the competitors also
had complementary products to their dominant ones, the integration of the whole
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Microsoft package was better than what the others could oer. Microsoft came
out as a winner in the erce price competition that followed and by 1995 had a
position of being dominant in both operating systems for personal computers as
well as productivity applications leading to a share of 50% in the whole personal
computer software market with a revenue of $6.08 billion.
4.1.2. More Success in Core Markets
The developments of Microsoft's products of course were never nished and there-
fore an array of new products were released: Windows 3.1 in 1992, later Windows
95 and Windows 98 and then Windows ME in 2000, all still relying on and com-
patible to MS-DOS. In 1993 Microsoft opened a new branch of development of
operating systems by introducing Windows NT 3.1, an operating system with the
same user interface as Windows 3.1, with no underlying MS-DOS but a newly
developed kernel6. The original idea was to still sell the MS-DOS based Windows
versions for private use and the Windows NT series for business, meaning work-
station computers and servers. It included many new features including higher
reliability, portability more platforms, not only IBM PC), a client-server concept,
a DOS virtual machine (such that DOS software could be run) and many more
(Operating System Documentation Project, n.d.). Successors were Windows NT
3.5, Windows NT 3.5.1, Windows NT 4.0 and Windows 2000. As DOS was not as
important any more and the NT line oered the more modern product, Microsoft
then decided to re-merge it's development and base it all on Windows NT. Win-
dows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008 followed.
The latest version is Windows 7 which came out in 2008. Although Vista was
not very successful and Linux operating systems were becoming better and better
Microsoft's position was not challenged. Windows 7 seems to be highly successful
again although it is still too early to measure the overall success. One of the many
reasons for the ongoing success is that the only choice a buyer of a new PC usually
has is between dierent Microsoft operating systems. Only very few vendors oer
6A kernel is the core part of an operating system.
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PCs with a Linux system or without any pre-installed operating system7.
Microsoft Oce also was renewed and improved constantly leading to new releases
every two years on average. Often times new products were introduced into the
packages, the rst one consisting of just 5 (Word, Excel, Access, PowerPoint and
Mail) while newer version also included Outlook (instead of Mail), Publisher and
some less known products. Microsoft still sold it's packages on Apples Mac plat-
form although it is threatened lately by Apples own products. As in the operating
systems market the only real competitor is an open source product. OpenOce is
based on Sun's StarOce which was released as open source in 1999 (OpenO-
ce.org, n.d.).
4.1.3. Other Operating Systems
In 1992 Microsoft launched the WinPad project, a project that was designated to
radically change the way an operating system was used with an eye on the mo-
bile world (PDAs - personal digital assistants). The project failed in 1994 due to
the fact that hardware for example for handwriting recognition or battery power
for mobile use were not good enough at that time (HPC:Factor, n.d.). The Pul-
sar project was started instead with the aim to build a handheld device where
Microsoft thought the future of computing would go but this also was a failure.
The two teams nevertheless were brought together to form the Pegasus team to
further develop their ideas which led to the release of Windows CE 1.0 in 1996, an
operating system for handheld PCs that had pretty much the same look as Win-
dows 95. The introduction of Windows CE 2.0 in 1997 made the system available
on many dierent processors and for many more dierent purposes like automo-
tive applications or consumer electronics, building certain features on top of the
Windows CE system (like Windows CE for Automotive, Windows CE Pocket PC,
Windows CE Smartphone). The system was also usually equipped with mobile
versions of the Internet Explorer and Oce applications like Word or Excel as
7Checking the product sites of the major PC companies like HP, Dell, Acer, Toshiba, Sony or
Samsung shows that almost all of the PCs comes with a pre-installed Windows version
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well as a connector to Outlook. This made Windows CE very compatible to the
other Windows products on PCs and was able to maintain a good user experience.
Many more version followed up to Windows CE 6.0, with Windows Mobile ver-
sions released up to Windows Mobile 6.5. The newest release Windows Phone 7
is based on Windows CE 6.0 and is redesigned to challenge new developments by
competitors Apple (iPhone), Google (Android), RIM and Symbian (Bright, n.d.).
It is not easy to get data about the success of the mobile and embedded branch of
Microsoft's operating systems due to the numerous ways the systems are used since
the beginning. One can still note that it became successful in the PDA market as
it was able to become the leader in 2004 (Jaques, 2004) although the division still
made losses of $64 million that year (HPC:Factor, n.d.). In the relatively new but
growing smartphone market Microsoft's systems were not really successful, having
market shares just around 15% from 2007 to 2009 even before Google Android
smartphones were widely available (The GigaOM Network, 2010). Whether the
Windows Phone 7 system can improve Microsoft's position in that market is yet
to be seen. However, an alliance formed in 2011 with the biggest yet struggling
mobile phone company Nokia might help in the long run (Microsoft, 2011).
4.1.4. Microsoft and the Internet
The Microsoft Internet Explorer was rst released in 1995 and was built on source
code from a company called Spyglass which was a young rm that came into the
browser market a few years earlier (Sink, 2003). It is clear today that Microsoft
did not foresee the future importance of the Internet and the threat that it could
become to it's platform dominance: In principle, web browsers could become the
basis of applications, making operating systems less important. This is a trend that
we clearly see today (see also the section about Google) but which was of course
not obvious in the early 1990s. When Microsoft realized the potential threat it was
quick to buy the needed technology and put a big project team to make up for it.
The rst version of the browser was oered either as an add-on to existing Windows
95 installations and also was added to later distributions of that software. Microsoft
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also released version 2.0 later that year and made it available to download for free
(Schnoll, n.d.). The dominant browser at that time (Netscape Navigator) was sold
at around $50 but still Microsoft was not able to become very popular so version
3.0 was released already one year later and became a lot more accepted. With
Internet Explorer 3.0 Microsoft also started to integrate the product very closely
to it's operating systems, changing the system when the browser was installed. This
practice was also done and improved when Microsoft introduced version 4.0 in 1997
which became an immediate success. Microsoft's share in the browser market was
growing further and further with the releases of versions 5.0 (1999) and 6.0 (2001),
peaking at around 95% in the US and Europe in 20048. The market share then fell
considerably due to the emergence of strong competitors like Mozilla Firefox (an
open source product based on the Netscape Navigator), Opera, Apple Safari and
Google Chrome and the refusal of Microsoft to improve it's product for some years.
Internet Explorer 7 was released in 2006 and 8 in 2008 with many new features
but both were not able to stop the losses in market share by Microsoft which in
2010 was down to about 60%. Version 9 was announced in 2010 and released in
2011 (IEBlog, n.d.).
Another important step was the introduction of MSN ("The Microsoft Network\)
in 1995 (Blogs, 2000) with an Internet search engine and as an ISP (Internet
Service Provider) for dial-up networks. Today, MSN is mostly recognized as being
an Internet portal and news site and many other applications have been added
to the brand over the years. In 1997 Microsoft bought Hotmail, a startup that
provided a free webmail service and had already millions of customers by 1997
and renamed it to MSN Hotmail (now: Windows Live Hotmail) (Craddock, n.d.).
Another important application is MSN Messenger (now: Windows Live Messenger)
which was launched in 1999 and is an application to for Internet chatting (Kunins,
2010). In 2005 Microsoft also launched it's own search engine and dumped Yahoo's
advertising program from it's site in 2006 to do advertising on it's own. In 2009
Bing was introduced as a new and innovative search engine and in the same year
Microsoft and Yahoo agreed to a deal such that Yahoo's web sites use the Bing
8One can nd an excellent article about the problems of measuring market share in the browser
market as well as a very comprehensive set of data sources at Wikipedia (Wikipedia, n.d.)
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search engine (BBC News, 2009a).
4.1.5. Complementary Products and New Markets
Microsoft shipped it's rst Media Player together with Windows 3.0 but this rst
version was not a very sophisticated piece of software, just able to play, stop and
forward (Liron, n.d.). But as with other products it improved the player with
every new version and provided it for free. From version 6.1 onwards Microsoft
called it's media player Windows Media Player and with version 7.1 Microsoft
also introduced it's own audio and video codecs (encoder and decoder). The latest
version is Windows Media Player 12 which was introduced together with Windows
7. The work done in this eld also led to special versions of it's operating system
called Windows Media Center which was available starting with Windows XP for
living room and other multimedia computers.
To develop software on it's operating systems Microsoft from the beginning in-
cluded tools to help developers, mostly for the BASIC programming language
(Lacher, n.d.; Microsoft .NET Support Team, 2009). It introduced Visual Basic in
1991 such that developers were able to use Windows' graphical elements to draw
the user interface and use Microsoft's API. In 1998 this led to the introduction of
the Microsoft Visual Studio, an integrated environment for Visual Basic but also
many other programming languages and better support for developers, making it
easier to write software for Windows. The .NET platform which was rst intro-
duced in 2002 developed this approach further and was put as a layer in between
Windows and applications to provide interoperability between dierent Windows
versions, an enhanced API, web technologies and a further convergence of the dif-
ferent languages. .NET therefore has similar goals as Java although limited to the
Windows platform (while Java can run on any operating system). The Mono Pro-
ject is an open source project that wants to bring the API and .NET applications
to Linux and other operating systems although it usually lags behind Microsoft's
versions of .NET (Mono, n.d.). Microsoft also introduced Silverlight in 2007 as a
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way to develop so called Rich Internet Applications (RIAs). Those applications
run in a browser with a certain plugin and are usually written by using Adobe
Flash technology or Java (Keesari, 2010). Again, Microsoft's product is not really
interoperable as there are no plugings for some operating systems (most notably
Linux) and certain browsers. The Mono Project also releases an open source ver-
sion of Silverlight called Moonlight. The Visual Studio and .NET (latest releases
are versions 10 and 4.0) are of course the main ways to write software for Windows
even though the Visual Studio can be quite expensive depending on the package
and the license. Whether Silverlight is able to take away a decent market share
from Flash has yet to be seen.
DirectX is Microsoft's API for game development on PCs to allow easy and ef-
cient access to the graphics hardware, sound hardware, gaming devices and so
on. It was released in 1995 to make game developers who were used to program-
ming games for DOS use Windows 95 for their new games (Coding Unit, n.d.a).
From then on almost every year a new version of DirectX was released (for free)
and producers of graphics hardware made their cards support the newest DirectX
platform. DirectX is only available on Windows operating systems. OpenGL is a
similar system that was created as an open platform in 1992 out of a graphics API
by SGI (Coding Unit, n.d.b). It can be used on almost any operating system and
hardware and is not only used for computer games but also by CAD programs and
other professional software. It is interesting to note that Microsoft also participa-
ted in the development of OpenGL but dropped out later (seemingly 2003 but I
was not able to nd a reliable source).
Microsoft is also a player in the hardware business going back to the 1980s when
the company developed a hardware mouse for the IBM platform which it still does
(as well as keyboards). Other hardware products are webcams, headsets, gaming
hardware and notebook accessories. A step into a completely new direction came
when Microsoft launched the Xbox, a gaming console, in 2001 (thegameconso-
le.com, n.d.). Although Microsoft wrote software and tools for gaming consoles
earlier, the move was seen as a surprise. One year later it introduced XBox Live
as a network for gamers that could purchase and play games online against other
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XBox players. In 2005 a new hardware version was released, the XBox 360. Alt-
hough both consoles were not extremely successful (rankings 14 and 10 in all-time
total gaming hardware sales) they seemed to have challenged incumbents Sony
and Nintendo to release newer version of their platforms (PS3 and Wii) and also
provide online gaming networks and newer technology (VGChartz, n.d.).
The last product group I want to mention here are mobile devices, products that
are seen as a way to battle Apple's success in the mobile world. In 2006 Microsoft
introduced the Zune player, an MP3 player and it was "predicted that the Zune
could do to the iPod what Windows PCs did to the Apple Mac\ (Robins, 2009).
This did not hold true however as Apple's iPod sold up to 50 times more than Zune
until 2008 (same source). Still, Microsoft is upgrading, developing and selling Zune
players and was even building a Zune network with a PC software to connect Zune
to, an online music and video store and software for other products like XBox and
Kin. Kin, a project to also oer phones directly (and not only operating systems
and software) was stopped just months after it was introduced in May 2010, so
this was hardly a success (Foley, 2010).
4.1.6. Dominance, Antitrust and Other Legal Issues
The rst important legal issue for Microsoft was one posed by Apple which sued
Microsoft in 1988 about copyright infringements of the Windows GUI but Micro-
soft won in 1994. More information about this case can be found in the section
about Apple.
In 1993 the US Justice Department started an investigation about Microsoft's
marketing practices for it's operating systems, taking over from the Federal Trade
Commission because of deadlocks in it's decision process9. This started a massive
process about several issues that would last for about 10 years between the Justice
Department and Microsoft, a summarizing timeline can be found at Wired.com
9The FTC Commission voted 2-2 which stopped the investigation in 1993 (Gilbert, 1999).
31
4.1 Microsoft 4 MARKET ANALYSIS
(2002) and a number of ocial documents about the case can be retrieved from
the Internet (Department of Justice - Antitrust Devision, n.d.). These rst inves-
tigations were settled rather quickly, leading to a consent decree that Microsoft
signed in 1994 (approved in court in 1995) and which forced Microsoft into giving
up some of it's anticompetitive practices. The European Commission signed a si-
milar deal with Microsoft the same year. Gilbert (1999) did an economic analysis
about the case and found several issues with Microsoft's marketing behavior from
a competition policy standpoint:
• Microsoft sold long-term contracts with large minimum commitments to
OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturer) which increased barriers to entry
for possible competitors even for higher than competitive prices. Of course
one can ask why OEMs would do such a contract that prevents entry from
a competitor which is usually good for OEMs. Gilbert's reason comes from
the fact that every individual OEM is too small to make entry from a Micro-
soft competitor protable and therefore is better o signing the long-term
contract. The high minimum commitments serve as a way to leave just very
little residual demand for entrants. Gilbert shows that many contracts were
very long (three to ve years) while the mimimum commitment often excee-
ded 50% of expected sales of one OEM. Of course, also positive eects can
be found in these contract which can be summarized by higher security for
both the buyer and the seller.
• Microsoft sold dierent licenses and one of those was a so called "per proces-
sor license\. With such a license an OEM had to pay a fee to Microsoft when
it sold a product with a certain processor independent of whether the system
was shipped with a Microsoft operating system or not. Microsoft usually sold
this license at the lowest price and the share of licenses reached 60% in 1993.
This also deters entry because an entrant has to sell at a very low price to
make up for the fee the OEM has to pay to Microsoft anyways. Even a more
ecient rm might have problems entering the market in this setup.
• Microsoft also imposed excessive nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) on de-
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velopers they worked with during development of a new operating system.
For developers it is important to be able to oer applications right when the
new operating system comes onto the market. For Microsoft the agreement
is important because otherwise developers could sell information about the
new product to competitors. However, the agreement for the development of
Windows 95 was so strict that it prevented some developers from working
with competitors for more than a year and therefore encouraged developers
to develop just for the Microsoft operating systems.
The consent decree limited the contracts to a maximum of one year with no mini-
mum commitment and limited the duration of NDAs. Microsoft was also prohibited
from selling per processor licenses although price discrimination and volume pri-
cing incentives were still allowed. It also prohibited Microsoft to tie it's operating
system sales to other products as well as contracts that restrict OEMs to purchase
products from competitors.
Complaints by Microsoft's competitors in application software that Microsoft used
it's internal knowledge about their operating system to gain a head start in appli-
cation programming for it's system were not discussed in the case although Gilbert
acknowledges it to be a (potentially) big problem and even Judge Sporkin raised
the issue during the hearing for the consent decree10.
In 1997 the Justice Department again started investigations because they believed
that Microsoft violated the agreement by tying operating system sales to it's In-
ternet Explorer products, requiring OEMs to install the Internet Explorer on sold
computers with a Microsoft 95 operating system. The Justice Department deman-
ded a ne of $1 million per day of violation and later even a break up of Microsoft
into two separate companies: Operating systems and application software. Micro-
soft's argument was that the Internet Explorer was not a separate product but
integrated into the operating system and that the Internet Explorer improves the
latter. Fisher (2000) argues that this is not necessarily the case and Microsoft's
10Note that also Campbell-Kelly argued that it was important for Microsoft to be able to bring
the Oce applications for Windows 3.0 to the market rst.
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action only made sense taking into account the fact that the Netscape browser
was a long-term threat to it's monopoly prots11. Davis and Murphy (2000) argue
that versions of Internet Explorer have been shipped independently but they also
show possible welfare enhancing eects and a zero-price strategy that is not an
anticompetitive strategy per se but makes sense for Microsoft nevertheless.
The trial against Microsoft lasted several more years with inputs from many com-
panies and questionaires of Microsoft's leaders. In 2000 the court ruled that Mi-
crosoft had "a monopoly in the market for Intel-compatible personal computer
operating systems" due to the \application barrier to entry". This barrier prevents
entry into the market because consumers would not switch to a new operating sys-
tem when there was just a limited number of applications available and software
companies would not develop applications for an operating system with just a few
users. Furthermore, it was acknowledged that middleware was a potential threat
to this monopoly because it could provide a layer between applications and the
operating system and therefore erode the application barrier to entry. The court
found Microsoft guilty of anticompetitive behavior against producers of middle-
ware (like the Netscape Navigator web browser or Java) and ordered a breakup of
Microsoft's operating systems and applications business. Microsoft appealed and
in 2001 the breakup was reversed although the nding of monopoly power and
anticompetitive behavior was upheld, leading to a a settlement between Microsoft
and the Justice Department in 2002. This settlement orders several rules of con-
duct for Microsoft including it's licensing practices and it's dealing with OEMs
especially when it comes to middleware. It was further agreed that Microsoft had
to make available APIs, communication protocols and related documentation \on
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms" to third parties and make it possible for
users and OEMs to uninstall Microsoft's middleware and designate an alternative
middleware in place of Microsoft's.
11He also argues that there has been more anticompetitive behavior by Microsoft in the direction
of Java by oering a Java environment ("polluted Java\) that was incompatible to others and
Apple by threatening to not develop Oce for it's platform anymore and put resources to
compete against Apple in audio and video. Apple also used the Internet Explorer as it's main
browser maybe due to these threats.
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Microsoft's issues with it's strategies and behavior took a dierent turn in Europe:
Starting points were complaints by Novell about Microsoft's licensing practices in
1993 and Sun's complaints that Microsoft did not provide information about it's
network interfaces and therefore prevented competitors from developing a compa-
tible network operating system (Abu-Haidar, 1993; McCullagh, 2002). This led to
investigations by the European Commission which found that Microsoft withheld
necessary information from it's competitors and bundled it's operating system with
the Windows Media Player (Parsons and Best, 2004). The EC imposed a record
ne of e497 million and required Microsoft to oer a version of Microsoft Windows
without the Windows Media Player and open up information about it's interfaces
for competitors12. The ne was further increased in 2006 as the European Com-
mission was unhappy with Microsoft not providing sucient technical information
(Lawsky and Zawadzki, 2006). In 2007 the Court of First Instance dismissed most
of Microsoft's appeal to the ruling including the ne, the requirement for a media
player free Windows and the requirement to provide information to competitors
(Court of Justice of the European Union, 2007). In 2008 an even greater ne (e899
million) was imposed by the European Commission which was also appealed by
Microsoft while the European Commission started to scrutinize on Microsoft's
bundling of it's browser with Windows (BBC News, 2009b). An agreement about
this issue was made in early 2010 when Microsoft agreed to oer it's customers
in Europe the choice between 12 dierent browsers including Microsoft's Internet
Explorer (BBC News, 2010a). In 2005 South Korea's Federal Trade Commission
imposed a ne of $ 23 million and ordered that Microsoft had to oer a version
of Windows without Windows Media Player and MSN Messenger. An appeal by
Microsoft was turned down in 2006 (Mook, 2006).
4.1.7. Summary, Strategies and Openness
Microsoft's root of success is closely linked to the success of the IBM platform,
a success that many authors believe is independent of the quality of Microsoft's
12A much more detailed impression about the decision can be gained by the issued commission
decision (Commission of the European Communities, 2002).
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operating systems. The success of Microsoft in the beginning is therefore not only
a matter of strategy (being the rst and cheapest operating system on the plat-
form) but also of luck, given the future importance of the platform that could not
have been foreseen and the choice of IBM to license operating systems instead of
providing it's own. The success in productivity applications can be linked to the
success of Windows 3.0, the head-start it got and the inability of the former in-
cumbents to provide timely products for Windows 3.0 and to counter Microsoft's
packaging strategy. Both products still make up a huge portion of Microsoft's
revenues today.
The platform Microsoft can provide is not a typical monopoly but one that is
protected even stronger: Due to lock-in and learning eects of users but also due
to the application barrier to entry. The only potential threat to this huge market
power lies in the possibility that operating systems and productivity platforms
might not be needed as much in the future: Middleware like web browsers might
provide the basis to (Internet) applications of the future, taking down the bar-
rier to entry. More recent developments of mobile platforms or the convergence
of computers and multimedia systems might require dierent operating system
capabilities, practically lowering the lock-in and learning eects that we observe.
Microsoft's strategy is to have a foot in the door on those developments by provi-
ding it's own web browser, mobile and embedded operating systems, multimedia
and mobile devices and gaming consoles. The impression though is that Micro-
soft's overall success in those areas is not as good as in the core business: Internet
Explorer developments have been stopped (and picked up again just very recent-
ly) leading to big losses in market share. The new mobile devices and operating
systems are not receiving the same hype as competitor's products and it's gaming
devices sales are still behind those of the incumbents. In fact, Microsoft is not
getting the lead in those developments but is usually behind facing a tough leader.
The operating system market power that helped gain momentum in some areas
cannot be used anymore due to the consistent pressure from competition agencies
around the globe where especially the European Commission is forcing Microsoft
to open up to competitors.
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The strategies of Microsoft concering openness are mixed: In the beginning, Mi-
crosoft developed for several platforms, even developed it's own Unix operating
system that could run all DOS applications and developed applications and pro-
gramming languages for several platforms including Apple and other Unix systems.
Microsoft's strategy to focus on IBM's platform and by providing it's DOS ope-
rating system to many vendors that oered IBM-type personal computers allowed
them to set a (proprietary) standard in the industry that it still holds. Although
Microsoft always oered products such that other companies could provide ap-
plication software for it's operating system (a necessity), the inner workings of
Microsoft's operating systems have not been available to other companies which
might have been an advantage in developing complementary products (Microsoft
Oce products or the Internet Explorer) and also helped strengthen the entry
barrier for prospective competitors. It needed several trials in the US and Europe
to make Microsoft open up some of it's interfaces, for example the SMB protocol
that connects Windows PCs or the MS Oce le formats.
On the other hand Microsoft often tried to squash open standards and build up
it's own: W3C is an initiative that provides open standards for HTML and Ja-
vaScript to develop web pages. Microsoft's browsers were always known for not
complying with the whole set of standards and even introduced a JScript language
which was basically an extension to JavaScript not approved by the W3C. Ano-
ther technology is ActiveX that allows software to run in a browser and behave
more like local software than typical web pages. The ActiveX technology is not
only known for many security bugs but also for the fact that it could only run
on Microsoft's browsers. DirectX is also a proprietary 3D standard developed by
Microsoft although with OpenGL an open alternative is available.
A very interesting aspect in Microsoft's strategy about openness and open source
software in particular are the so called \Halloween Documents". Those documents
were written by a Microsoft product manager and posted on the Internet by a
well known Linux developer, although it is not entirely clear how he got it in the
rst place13. The name \Halloween Documents" was given due to the fact that the
13People at Microsoft acknowledged that the documents were authentic although they referred
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release date of the rst document was on November 1, 1998. A news report about
the documents can be found at (Trott, 1998) while the original and commented
release can be found at (Raymond, n.d.). Those documents are studies about the
open source process and success as well as Linux and how it relates to Microsoft's
business, products and strategies. The basic result of those investigations is that
open source and Linux in particular can be a threat and that the quality of Linux
cannot be neglected. Open source is strongest when protocols are \commodities"
(my take would be to use the word \open"), therefore the authors argue: \By ex-
tending these protocols and developing new protocols, we can deny OSS projects
entry into the market." Although it is not clear whether Microsoft really develo-
ped these insights into a real strategy, Microsoft's behavior with respect to open
standards and interfaces seems quite close.
Another point made by the authors of the papers is that from Microsoft's point
of view Linux does or will \cream skim" the best features of Microsoft's operating
systems and include it into it's own features. This would be a big threat to Micro-
soft as it has to invest into the development of the features which then would be
copied into Linux. The authors also recommend that Microsoft should investigate
into whether patents and copyright might be a way to compete against Linux. In
2007 Microsoft claimed that Linux and other open source software infringes a total
of 235 patents held by Microsoft although the company later promised that they
will not sue Linux users (Parlo, 2007; McDougall, 2007). Microsoft would not re-
veal which patents were infringed, leading the Linux founder and main developer
Linus Torvalds to tell Microsoft to test the allegations in court or at least open
up the information so that Linux could develop around those patents (Babcock,
2007).
Still, more recent developments seem to go into a more open direction, maybe for-
ced by the legal problems with the old strategy, maybe due to a change in culture
inside the company or maybe due to demands for more open and interoperable
products. As already mentioned above Microsoft does not prevent open source
to it as \low-level engineering studies" while the developer believes it reects Microsoft's
strategy against open source.
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developers form porting it's .NET and Silverlight framework to Linux but even
seems to encourage it at least to a certain extent. In 2006 Microsoft and Novell
(the company distributing the popular SuSE Linux distribution) announced a deal
that included a patent agreement, an agreement on interoperability (in virtuali-
zation, web services and data formats) and a business collaboration agreement
(Gardner, 2006). This agreement not only freed up Novell from any patent issues
with Microsoft but also made Microsoft an indirect distributor of Linux, buying
70,000 coupons for SuSE Linux for sale to it's customers. In 2009 an agreement
with Red Hat (distributor of Red Hat Linux) was announced to work together
in the area of virtualization (Vaughan-Nichols, 2009). With Microsoft Oce 2007
Microsoft introduced a new open and standardized document format called Oce
Open XML14. Although Microsoft therefore added another standard to the already
existing open and standardized Open Document Format (ODF) used by OpenO-
ce Microsoft also developed a plug-in such that ODF could be used with Microsoft
Oce. Later products also supported Adobe's PDF format. Microsoft now even
has it's own branch of open source products, two dierent open source licenses
for those products, an open repository for open source products (CodePlex) and
claims that it is working with and improving existing open source projects like the
Linux Kernel, Apache or PHP15. Critics however claim that Microsoft's step into
open source development is not sincere and that those projects are \encumbered
with a dependency" on Microsoft's baseline products (Oliver, 2010).
Overall, one can claim that Microsoft faired quite will in the past with it's closed
approach. It allowed them to gain dominance in some sectors and gave them a
starting point for the jump onto others. Competitors of course could not survive
when Microsoft included products into it's operating systems (seemingly for free
or even enforcing it's use by OEMs). Some of those strategies were decided to be
anticompetitive by courts in the US and Europe and Microsoft was forced to give
up some of it's practices leading to a more open approach in the recent past. Of
course, there is still no conclusive evidence how Microsoft's strategy and it's use of
14Although it was argued that it might not be completely documented and free of patents.
15The Linux Kernel is the main part of Linux, Apache is the leading HTTP web server and PHP
is the leading scripting language for dynamic web pages
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openness will look like in the future, especially since it is not clear yet how much
importance operating systems will have when mobile devices, virtualization and
the convergence of products become even more important. And of course there is
always the threat of some middleware to take the barrier to entry away and the
always-continuing evolution of Linux or OpenOce as alternatives to Microsoft's
main products.
4.2. Apple
4.2.1. The Beginning of Apple Computer and First Success
Apple Computer was founded by Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak and Ronald Wayne
in 1976, the latter dropping out of the company just months later due to the risky
nature of the beginning business. Jobs was a college dropout who was working
at Atari at the time while Wozniak (also a college dropout) was working at HP.
The two were friends for many years and shared an interest in electronics. The
rst computer (later called the Apple I) was developed a year earlier by Wozniak
who was driven by the idea to build a computer on his own and was inspired by
the Altair 8800 computer, a kit to build a personal computer. The Apple I was
quite basic with cheap components and was maybe more a study or a project of
interest for Wozniak but Jobs saw the opportunity to make it a product16. This also
clearly showed the dierent type of people the two founders were: Wozniak was an
engineer, some even believe an electronics genius who never wanted to have his own
company and also was no visionary but driven by interesting projects or dicult
problems in engineering. Jobs on the other hand always had big ideas, especially
for business but was maybe just an average engineer. After neither HP nor Atari
wanted to use Wozniak's development Jobs was able to persuade Wozniak into
forming a company and brought Wayne over from Atari. They sold the Apple I
to local computer enthusiasts, stores and the Byte Shop possibly the rst retail
16It was not really a computer in a modern sense but rather a circuit board to which a case,
peripherals and a power supply had to be added to make it useful.
40
4 MARKET ANALYSIS 4.2 Apple
computer store chain. This allowed them to make a solid prot and soon Wozniak
began working on an improved computer called Apple II while Jobs worked on
getting enough funding for increasing their business.
They got to know Mike Markkula, a 34 year old retiree from Fairchild Semiconduc-
tor who came out of retirement to work on a business plan for Apple and provided
funding from his own pocket as well as from external sources. Markkula, Jobs and
Wozniak incorporated Apple in 1977 and purchased the old partnership that Way-
ne had already left. The Apple II came out in April 1977 and was sold at $1,298
(the Apple I was sold at $666). It was not only revolutionary in it's features but
also was the rst computer for the mass market, with a plastic case, an integrated
keyboard and power supply, color graphics capability (one could use a TV set as a
display), 8 expansion slots for additional hardware and a Basic programming lan-
guage licensed by Microsoft called Applesoft. Important for it's success was also a
disk drive developed by Wozniak that could be used in an expansion slot but even
more important was a program called VisiCalc, a spreadsheet program written in
Applesoft that became very popular. The Apple II and successive versions of it
were very successful and sold over 300,000 times before IBM even introduced it's
rst PC in 1981. What proved very popular were the expansion slots of the Apple
II and many other companies sold hardware for it. Even after Apple introduced
several other products (see below) and wanted to drive demand to those more
expensive ones the Apple II still held it's own and was Apple's cashcow for a long
time. The last version of Apple II called Apple IIGS was introduced in 1985 and
sold until 1994.
Apple went public at the end of the year 1980 and made the founders and many
of the rst employees instant millionaires. After that the companies' fortunes tur-
ned a little bit as Wozniak was heavily injured during a plane crash and left the
company for a couple of years. By 1981 it became clear that the developments of
the new products did not go as smoothly as expected as many engineers worked
on side projects with not much commercial sense and so some employees had to be
laid o that year. The new products that were started in three dierent projects
were constantly outsold by the newer versions of Apple II which were introduced in
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parallel. The rst new project was the Apple III, a computer designed for business
with more features while Apple II should still sell for private use. Apple III was
rst announced in May 1980 but due to problems with the design and production
the computer was altered and was rst shipped in March 1981. After some of the
computers were sold in 1981 it also became clear that there were some principle
problems with it, especially with the cooling mechanism. Apple IIIs therefore often
failed during usage and were not very reliable. The price was also very high com-
pared to the Apple II at around $4,000. Even after some of the technical problems
were revised and the price was lowered to around $3,000 later in 1982 the Apple
III was a disappointment for Apple, it did not nearly sell as well as the Apple II
did and was dropped in 1984.
Even before Apple III was introduced Apple started another project called Lisa
from which the company hoped to develop a computer to replace the Apple II
(and I guess also the Apple III) line of products. The project was heavily inuenced
(\inspired" is the word used at Apple) by the Xerox Alto, a revolutionary computer
developed at Xerox Parc in the 1970s that already had many features of modern
computers like a graphical operating system with overlapping windows controlled
by a mouse17. It was clear immediately to Jobs and others at Apple that this
would be the future of computing and they wanted to build something similar
with their Lisa project. Apple also hired many employees from Xerox during that
time. When volume shipments of the Lisa computer began in June 1983 the price
for the computer and a bundle of software was set to $9,995 and it had problems
from the start. Next to the hefty price the Lisa was incompatible to the Apple II
and III and therefore no other software was able to run on it. The Lisa also was too
slow and unreliable and Apple had no experience in selling this kind of computers
that were too expensive for the typical Apple user at that time. And then, it was
clear to many customers that the computer from the third project (Mac) was to
be introduced shortly, having almost Lisa-type features for a much lower price.
Although Apple later unbundled software and hardware and sold the hardware
at a much lower price the computer never became a success and the project was
stopped in 1985.
17The Xerox Alto was never sold but it is believed that it would have cost around $40,000.
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The third project was called the Macintosh and was started by former Xerox
employee Je Raskin to build a computer at a very low price: The target at the
beginning was around $500. Although Jobs was not a fan of the project initially
he took it over after he was not allowed to work with the Lisa team and the
project goal seemingly changed from making a cheap computer to beating the
Lisa. The \Mac\ was introduced in January 1984 and was smaller and faster than
the Lisa but also cheaper at $2,495 while many features like the graphical window
manager and some software were the same. Still, the rst Mac had some aws,
for example not much memory and also no color capabilities as well as no disk
drive and no expansion slots, but it nevertheless sold much better than the Lisa
initially. Although just half a year later Apple quadrupled the memory of the Mac
the sales dropped late in 1984 and also failed the big expectations. For private use
it was maybe still too early and too expensive to conquer the mass market and
for business use it was just not designed for, having not enough memory and not
enough (and possibly the wrong) applications that could run on it. What did not
help either was that the original Mac development team was exhausted and many
left the company or the project so further improvements of the Mac were not easy
to come by.
4.2.2. The First Crisis
The problem for Apple was that it still had to rely on it's old Apple II (although
often enhanced) and the new projects although in some aspects revolutionary did
not sell well. And the business environment got tougher: IBM introduced it's PC
in 1981 and was very successful immediately even when Apple believed that the
technology was far inferior to it's own. Other companies came into the market and
oered product clones of the IBM PC and Microsoft was selling and licensing it's
DOS system to all those companies, hence, building up a network of compatible
computers which also attracted software companies. Although it is not entirely
clear how IBM was able to gain a great market share with a technically inferior
product, there are some hints:
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• The IBM PC was cheaper than all the new Apple products and about the
same price as Apple II.
• IBM was the biggest computer company in the world, making revenues with
mainframes, services and software. Therefore, there were big expectations for
the product and it's further development.
• Many rms immediately started to develop software for the IBM PC, belie-
ving in the success while strengthening the platform.
• The platform was open in a way that competitors could oer compatible
products ("clones\). This led to a diverse set of oers for dierent customers.
• As described above, Microsoft quickly became the dominant operating sys-
tem for the IBM PC but it was also allowed by the licensing agreement with
IBM to license it to other vendors, therefore enabling a bigger platform and
high compatibility for software companies.
As the IBM platform took o, often driven by new Intel processors, new versions
of DOS and better and more application software, Apple was stuck with revolu-
tionary but overpriced products that had technical aws and not enough software
to compete and an old product that at Apple many executives did not really like
anymore (even though it was still the cash cow). The introduction of the Ma-
cIntosh Oce in January 1985 was also unable to turn the tide as one crucial
piece (a leserver) would still need two years onto the market. Apple also posted
it's rst quarterly loss and the stock fell to an all-time low in June. And what
was also pretty clear in the midst of the 1980s: Computers or computer hard-
ware became a commodity market. Even IBM had problems in the PC market
competing with ever decreasing prices against other companies on it's own plat-
form. The important piece was software and the operating system was important
as an underlying platform while providing programming languages and libraries
for software development. The hardware market slumped during that time which
obviously worsened Apple's problems.
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The solution might have been to separate hardware and the operating system which
basically meant opening the operating system and trying to make it a standard
in the PC world (even on the IBM platform). This would have been possible for
Apple in a way Microsoft did it in the 1990s because Apple clearly had the better
product. When Microsoft introduced Windows, it needed until version 3.0 in the
early 1990s to oer a quality (in terms of features) that Apple already achieved
with the Lisa and the Mac product line. Microsoft even approached Apple in
1985, handing over a basic strategy paper to make Apple's operating system an
industry standard18 (Carlton, 1997). Today, it might seem strange that Microsoft
did this but back then it was not clear whether Microsoft would ever reach the kind
of quality and Bill Gates was often cited in praising the Mac operating system.
Furthermore, Microsoft was making a lot of money with software for the Mac and
believed it could make even more when the operating system became an industry
standard. History did take a dierent route though as many core Apple developers
and managers believed that the operating system was their asset and allowed them
to sell hardware: "Why sell an operating system software for $100 like Gates did
when you could wrap it in hardware and sell it for $2,000?" Goodell (1996, p.159).
Furthermore, Apple's philosophy was (and is) to build a complete product with
software tailored to the hardware and vice versa. This is what made the products
easier to use and less error-prone than in the IBM-Intel-Microsoft world. Although
Apple often discussed licensing the operating system later, when they nally agreed
to do it, it was already too late (see below).
From a personal perspective also many things changed that year: John Scully, the
CEO who was hired personally by Steve Jobs in 1983 fell out with Jobs who on the
other hand could not stand the criticism of the MacIntosh. In the struggle for power
Scully stripped Jobs who had still a share of about 11% of all operational duties.
Although leading managers wanted to keep him in as chairman, Jobs resigned
and started NeXT with several other former Apple employees. Earlier that year
also Steve Wozniak resigned citing frustration over the lack of support from the
management for the Apple II line of computer he was still (or, again) working on.
18Reading this, one can clearly identify the strategy that Microsoft chose when Windows was
nally good enough to do it.
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Therefore, in 1985 the founders of Apple were no longer part of the company. Also,
about a fth of all employees at Apple were released that year.
What got Apple out of the slump was not something that Apple did but was
coming from the outside: Aldus, a very little startup software company released
the PageMaker in July 1985, a software to put text and graphics together on
documents to print them out. When Apple found out about that software they
donated a Mac such that Aldus would write the software for it and it became
also clear that together with a Mac and Apple's laser printer (a product initially
developed for the MacIntosh Oce campaign) it allowed publishing from a home
computer and therefore became a huge success. Another killer software was found
(as VisiCalc was for the Apple II) and together with it's printers Apple was able to
turn the Mac into a successful product and the company back on track. Lots of new
Macs with better hardware and upgraded software were released, the hardware was
nally opened for expansion slots and together with Aldus PageMake, Microsoft's
productivity software, Apple's great operating system and solid hardware it was
able to oer a lot to potential customers with prot markups of 50% or even
more.
4.2.3. The Second Crisis
But the second crisis was already in it's beginning stage although Apple was again
a hugely protable company for many years. Although the IBM platform with
Microsoft DOS and a lot of application software outsold the Apple products easily
Apple had a nice niche and lots of prots. The problem so to speak was Microsoft.
Although it was also a key partner for Apple from the very beginning, providing
programming languages and software for the Apple II and later for the Mac, it was
also clear that as the dominating operating system producer for the IBM platform
it was also a competitor. In the mid 1980s Windows was still no competition
though but it was clear that many of it's features were similar to those of Apple's
operating system. Although Apple was the much bigger company in 1985 and
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Apple threatened to sue for copyright infringement Bill Gates was able to get Apple
into an agreement that allowed Microsoft to use some of Apple's technology for a
delayed release of Microsoft Excel for Windows. Clearly, Apple needed Microsoft
in 1985 more than Microsoft needed Apple but the deal was a bad one for Apple
especially as Microsoft wasn't even able to ship it's product for Windows as early
as Apple feared.
That the scope of this agreement was not entirely clear became obvious when
Apple started a copyright infringement lawsuit against Microsoft (and HP) after
Microsoft released Windows 2.03, coming closer and closer to cloning Apple's user
interface. The question then was whether the agreement allowed the use of Apple's
technology just for Windows 1.0 (as Apple was claiming) or for all subsequent
versions as well (as Microsoft was claiming). A rule in 1989 declared that almost
all of Apple's violation claims were allowed due to the 1985 agreement. Later,
the courts favored Apple's stance a little more but in 1993 the case was decided
in favor of Microsoft. Further appeals by Apple were dismissed. Another major
point made during the trial was that even when some of the stu Microsoft was
using was not in the scope of the 1985 agreement, those objections were just not
protected by copyright law anyway, leaving Apple with not much legal power.
It was therefore clear for Apple that Microsoft was allowed to build an operating
system close to the Mac operating system and that it will eventually catch up
and take away Apple's technological lead. Therefore, Apple went back to what it
always did when facing competition in it's core market: Build new revolutionary
devices and open up a new market which was believed to be the future. Apple's
answer was a project called Newton, already started in 1987 as a research pro-
ject for an eventual Apple handheld computer. The project apparently became a
favorite of CEO Sculley and therefore was pushed, setting the initial release year
to 1992. Most important targeted features were handwriting recognition, a new
programming language, productivity software and long battery life. But the deve-
lopment just did not work very well as the focus was often shifted between dierent
versions (or sizes) of the product and the processor had to be changed during the
development, setting back the eorts several times. And the announcements of
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the product by Apple's managers and the huge expectations did not help either
while ship dates were missed frequently. And when the rst product, the Newton
MessagePad, began shipping in August 1993 at a cost of $699 the product had
still many bugs19 and the handwriting recognition was very poor. There was also
no third party software for the product. Still, the Newton received lots of positive
feedback and was again a revolutionary Apple product but just did not work as
well as expected and maybe the time also was not right. Companies like Palm or
Sharp would eventually take over the market with cheaper and less error-prone
products. And even Microsoft stepped into that business by introducing it's Win-
dows CE operating system in 1996. Apple still improved it's MessagePads and
eventually sold a greater variety with lower and higher priced products but had
to discontinue all development eorts in 1998. The installed base in 1998 was just
about 150,000 to 300,000 while Windows CE already sold 500,000 times and the
total development and marketing cost for Apple's Newton was estimated at about
half a billion dollars.
Although Apple was able to land a hit with the PowerBook series, a set of laptop
computers that started in 1991 and the MacIntosh computers were still selling well,
problems began to mount at Apple in the midst of the 1990s: In 1994 and 1995
Apple completely misforecasted the demand for it's products, trying to sell high-
price computer when customers wanted low-price and vice versa. The market also
picked up in 1995 but Apple underestimated the demand and could not meet it. It
also had troubles with it's suppliers such that in June 1995 there was a backorder
of $ 1 billion in Apple products. Apple's newest PowerBook 5300 also had major
design issues: First with it's battery that took re in early releases and then with
the case, the power plug and power supply, leading to two recalls and a loss of a
third of PowerBook revenues in 1996.
When Michael Spindler became CEO from John Scully in 1993 he nally addressed
the licensing issue. The rst problem was that operating system and hardware were
19A "bug\ is a design or programming error in a software. There are many stories about the
origin of this term in computer science but it often has to do with a small animal destroying
some electronics parts in ancient times of computer engineering.
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so tightly coupled that there was just minimal interest from PC vendors because
many believed they could not compete with Apple on their own platform. Apple
therefore joined (together with Motorola) IBM's Common Hardware Reference
Platform (CHRP) in November 1994 and this would later become the PowerPC
platform, a hardware platform with standard ports and components that could run
Apple's operating system. This attracted some smaller vendors to license Apple's
operating system. Apple's goal was to get a market share of the platform up from
about 10% to about 20% in ve years but it did not work: Scepticism took over just
one year later at Apple as one competitor (Power) was able to gain a 10% share on
the platform by targeting the high-price segment. Apple's managers believed that
they lose more to the competition than they gain from the expanded platform and
the licensing fee. The experiment was nally stopped in 1997, marking the end
to companies like Power. And then, Windows 95 came out, nally an operating
system from Microsoft that was as good as Apple's which gained a huge momentum
also due to Microsoft's marketing and advertising eorts.
4.2.4. Back to Success and New Products
Apple was in deep trouble and reported a loss of $740 million in the second quarter
of 1996. 2,800 employees were laid o that year but one important employee came
back to the company: Steve Jobs, who since he left 11 years ago has made a
fortune with his investment in Pixar, came back due to the fact that Apple bought
the company he founded: NeXT Computer Inc. Jobs was rst put in an advisory
role for then-CEO Gel Amelio but became the interim CEO in 1997 after Amelio
resigned. The way Jobs reshaped and turned around Apple is widely viewed as the
major reason Apple became a very successful company again.
The reason for Apple's purchase of NeXT was it's operating system. This has
been an issue for many years for the people at Apple as they felt they needed to
remake the Mac operating system to get back into the technological lead. Projects
at Apple like Copland did not work out and the incremental improvements of the
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old operating system did not prevent Microsoft from catching up. When Apple fell
into the deep crisis in 1996 and internal projects were still far from being ready
for the market, Apple's management looked for external help: They talked about
making BeOS it's new operating system or Suns Solaris and even thought about
getting a license for Windows NT, Microsoft's successful server and workstation
operating system.
The decision for NeXT in retrospect was the right one. Not just because of the
operating system that would form the basis for future Apple operating systems
but because it brought Jobs back to Apple who immediately made important
decisions to get Apple back on track: Several projects and product developments
(like the Newton) as well as the licensing experiment were stopped, new ways
of marketing were explored (deals with CompUSA, an Internet store for Apple
products and later even retail stores called Apple Store), a greater emphasis was
placed on design and new products and product categories introduced. Jobs even
made an agreement with Microsoft, ensuring continuous software development
from Microsoft for the Apple platform and cash for making the Internet Explorer
the standard browser for the Mac and patent agreements. Apple under Steve Jobs
was to get back to what made them very protable in the years before: Oering high
quality and technologically advanced products that allowed them to get around
price competition and cash in high margins.
Apple's rst product developments after Jobs became the interim CEO were big
successes: First, the high-end Power Mac with a G3 processor from IBM and
Motorola sold very well and for a nice margin. Then, the iMac, a consumer PC
with a new design including an integrated display and equipped with lot of great
hardware for just $1,299 which was very popular especially for new PC users. And
then, the iBook, a consumer laptop which also was a great piece of design and
hardware for only $1,599. One year after it's introduction the iMac became the
then best selling computer in the US and Apple doubled it's market share to 11.2%
in 1999.
The operating system developments led to Mac OS X, a new operating system
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based on a Unix kernel called Darwin which was nally shipped in January 2002.
It immediately became the standard operating systems for all Apple computers
and it also had an emulator such that old Mac software could run on it, ensuring
full compatibility to the old platform. Further versions of Mac OS X are still
used today as the operating systems for Apple's personal computers. Although the
technological lead is not as big as it was in 1984 when the MacIntosh was introduced
one can still argue that Apple has the lead over Microsoft in the operating system
department, even after the introduction of Windows 720.
The rst prot after the crisis was made in the rst scal quarter of 1998, leading
to an annual prot of $309 million that year. After Apple made a prot of $601
million in 1999, Steve Jobs agreed to become the CEO, stripping the "interim\
from his title. Although also Apple was hit by the burst of the dot-com bubble
(leading to a loss of $25 million in 2001), the foundation was laid for Apple to
open up new markets in the next century.
4.2.5. Digital Lifestyle
In 2001 Apple introduced iTunes, a software to play and deal with music les and
burn them to CD. Later the same year Apple introduced it's rst iPod and the
second version of iTunes. The iPod was an MP3 player and although there were
already many players on the market and it had a high price of $399 it became a
breakthrough product for Apple. Not only did it present a good compromise bet-
ween size and storage capacity, it also had a distinguishable design and integrated
very well to the iTunes software that could transfer music to the iPod via a Fire-
wire connection which at that time was a lot faster than USB. But these rst steps
into a new market were just the basis for many things to come. In 2002 models
with higher capacity and slightly changed design were introduced and iTunes was
also made available for Microsoft Windows.
20When Windows 7 came out there were again accusations that several features were copied
from the Mac OS X although there are no legal disputes over that matter.
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Another breakthrough was the introduction of the iTunes Music Store in 2003.
Although there have been ideas and concepts before how to sell music over the
Internet, nobody was able to make it work. Apple on the other hand did, by
integrating it into it's iTunes software and making a great user interface, by getting
all the ve big music companies on board (such that over 200,000 songs were
already available at the introduction) and by having a very convenient sales concept
such that every song cost $0.99. And although Apple did not have a big direct
prot selling music it won indirectly by selling even more high margin iPods who
in 2004 was by far the best selling MP3 player. Further hardware version were
introduced later including USB connections, smaller devices without display, video
capabilities, cameras and so on.
An even greater and in the future maybe more important market was opened
for Apple when Steve Jobs introduced the iPhone in 2007 even though there was
already a huge saturated market for mobile phones (dominated by Nokia) and a
smaller market for so called smartphones with strong incumbents (RIM, Palm and
again Nokia). Smartphones like the iPhone are devices that combine the features
of mobile phones with features of organizers (the old Newton was a device of that
kind). One can call and write SMS, one can read, write and organize les, one can
deal with an electronic calender, tasks, contacts and email, one can connect to the
Internet to browse webpages and one can run software. Apple's iPhone can do all
that but to distinguish itself Apple added features that made it a revolutionary
product: Most other smartphones came with tiny keyboards or a little touch stick
but with the included multi-touch panel one could use the Apple iPhone with nger
touches and gestures only. This was a new way of control and user experience and
became a huge success. Furthermore, the big and high resolution screen and the
great integration of Apple's Safari web browser together with the touch control
made it a great device for mobile web access. It also included iPod functionality
such that it could be used as an MP3 and video player as well. And it of course
also had the indistinguishable Apple design. The price for the iPhone started with
$499 for the 4GB version and $599 for the 8GB version but was sold a lot cheaper
by mobile service providers that also introduced special iPhone data packages.
Apple also enhanced the exclusivity of the iPhone by making contracts with single
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mobile service partners, for example AT&T in the US, giving them a monopoly
in exchange for an additional fee per sold iPhone (Siegler, 2010). Although the
contract is rumored to last until 2012, Apple agreed to open up in 2011 and also
provide iPhones to rival Verizon (Thomson, 2010).
Apple improved the iPhone with each version, getting rid of limitations that were
criticized with the earlier versions: The iPhone 3G from 2008 added support for
3G networks (UMTS) and GPS and added an App Store where users could buy,
download and install third-party software while developers could easily upload and
sell software over that platform. The huge success of the iPhone also made the App
Store grow and Apple also gets a percentage of every sold piece of software there.
The iPhone 3GS from 2009 improved the hardware with a better processor, more
memory and a higher resolution camera and software with the third version of the
iOS operating system. The iPhone 4 from 2010 again improved the processor and
the display, added a second camera, better battery life and the fourth version of
the iOS introduced multitasking21. Although iPhones are still a success for Apple
and the number of devices is growing, there are still some challenges: RIM is still
holding ground, especially for business smartphones (The GigaOM Network, 2010),
phones powered by Google's Android are strong competitors (see below), Microsoft
has not given up on this segment with the introduction of Windows Phone 7 (see
above), Nokia is still working to defend it's position in the market (forming an
alliance with Intel (Nokia Blog, 2010) and later with Microsoft (Microsoft, 2011))
and there was also controversy about signal problems with the newest iPhone
(Beaumont, 2010).
The Apple TV was rst introduced in 2007 as a settop box to connect to the
Internet and the local network, streaming audio and video to the TV. The product
was upgraded in 2010 with better hardware, better software and the ability to rent
movies and tv shows over the Internet (Rigby and Randewich, 2010). Of course it
21Multitasking means that many software instances can run "at the same time\ either from
a system or a user perspective. This concept is common in personal computers since the
1990s but was not used in earlier versions of the iPhone. The reason was seemingly that for
multitasking to work well lots of computing power and memory are needed which were lacking
in earlier versions of the iPhone.
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is not yet clear how the expected convergence of TV and Internet will take place
and if Apple can play a role. But it is a development one has to have an eye on,
especially as Google is also launching it's Google TV services (see below).
A completely new and revolutionary product is the iPad which was released in
2010. Same think of it as a huge iPhone, some of a new concept for tablet computers
and some even as a new concept for notebooks. The iPad is something in between:
It also has a multi-touch screen like the iPhone but a lot bigger, being more the
size of a tablet or a small notebook. The usability concept is similar to that of
an iPhone (using the touchscreen, no keyboard and no mouse) but the larger size
makes it more useful for tasks like reading texts (or ebooks), surng the web and
dealing with les.
Although the digital lifestyle products today make up a big fraction of Apple's
revenue and prots it is still a innovative computer manufacturer. In 2005 Ap-
ple announced that it would switch from the Power PC microprocessors (IBM,
Motorola) to Intel microprocessors for it's newest computers starting in 2006 (Ap-
ple, 2005). This was an interesting move as Apple was the only major competitor
against IBM's Intel-driven platform for over 20 years, leaving the PowerPC pro-
cessors for gaming consoles, high-end servers and workstations. The reason for the
switch according to Apple was the fact that their people liked Intel's roadmap for
processors more than IBM's, acknowledging rumors that Apple was not satised
with the latest Power PC processors. Although Apple still uses it's Mac OS X
as the primary operating system in 2006 it announced Boot Camp, a software to
install Microsoft operating systems on Apple hardware in parallel (BBC News,
2006).
Looking at some data Apple shows a remarkable growth this decade (Pingdom,
2010). But this is not only due to the diversication of the portfolio but also due
to a steady growth in portable and desktop computer segments. Still, quarterly
data shows that the new product lines are very important because in the third
scal quarter of 2010 "iPhone and Related Products and Services\ was making
the highest revenues of all of Apple's branches and roughly the same revenue
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as the totals of desktops, portables and general hardware and software together
(Apple, 2010). The total revenue for that quarter is $15.7 billion and the prot is
$3.25 billion. In May 2010 Apple also overtook Microsoft in market capitalization,
making it the biggest tech company in the world at $222 billion although Microsoft
still enjoyed higher revenues and prots (BBC News, 2010b).
4.2.6. Summary, Strategies and Openness
The history of Apple clearly shows the strategy of the company when it comes to
it's products: Build sophisticated, sometimes even revolutionary products and sell
them for relatively high prices. Market share is just a very secondary goal and the
software developed and sold is used to promote the marketability of it's systems
(this even includes it's content business - music, tv shows and movies).
This strategy is clearly shown by it's decision (indecision might be the better
word) about licensing. Licensing of the superior operating system was not seen as
a way of enhancing (long term) market share and protability but as a problem for
the (short term) margins and system sales. Licensing in the eyes of Apple would
give competing computer manufacturers the key to catch up and the competition
Apple might face would erode prots. Of course, one can argue that building
hardware and the operating system together improves integration and therefore
product quality and stability but this of course does not rule out licensing to
other manufacturers, in fact this ensures Apple a technological lead even when the
operating system is licensed because competitors do not have this advantage. The
newest Mac OS X versions therefore are still not licensed and cannot be installed
on typical IBM-type computers even as due to Apple's move to Intel processors
the platform dierence is quite small22.
A source of controversy has been the App Store and it's openness (or lack the-
reof): Not only does Apple not allow any applications to be distributed to it's
22Several hackers and projects showed that with a few tweaks it is possible to run Mac OS X on
any Intel machine.
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mobile devices from any other platform, it also charges 30% from the price of
any software sold over the App Store and has the right to reject any application
from the App Store. This includes for example third-party web browsers. Apple
also changed the developer guidelines in 2010, making it even tighter: It enforced
the use of just a few programming languages and did not allow several scripting
languages, eectively locking out alternative development platforms (Northcott,
2010). This is especially interesting because Adobe had already presented a way
to translate Flash applications into iPhone applications which would allow deve-
lopment of compatible applications for all major smartphone platforms23 (Ionescu,
2009). The issue led to an Antitrust investigation by the European Commission
(Gamet, 2010). In September 2010 Apple changed the rules again, now allowi-
ng those cross-compiling tools in principle such that the European Commission
dropped the investigation. This of course does not rule out that cross-compiled
applications can be banned in the future considering that Apple can still reject
any application it does not like.
Furthermore Apple does not make it's iTunes software compatible to other MP3
players or smartphones which would be possible by using an open interface to which
those other products could connect to. This compatibility issue became apparent
in 2009 when the Palm Pre smartphone was announced to be able to connect to
iTunes by pretending to be an iPhone during the connection. This led to an update
of iTunes taking away this possibility but later Palm introduced another update
that would again work with iTunes (Paczkowski, 2009). Although it is not clear if
this can persist, it was clearly shown that Apple does not want other hardware to
be able to use it's platform24.
Although Apple does not really open up it's systems in terms of compatibility the
company has a quite relaxed standing when it comes to open source. Several key
products or parts of it's products are open source, for example some components
23All other major smartphone platforms can run native Flash applications but the iPhone does
not.
24This of course makes perfectly sense as Apple makes money with hardware and gives away soft-
ware and complementary products for a low price or even for free. Allowing other companies
access to it's complements can obviously hurt Apple's hardware sales.
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of it's operating systems are based on FreeBSD, an open source Unix operating
system and the Safari web browser is based on WebKit, an open source browser
engine project that Apple is contributing to (Buys, 2010). This blends in very well
with the company's overall strategy: For Apple, software is a way to sell hardware
and therefore it makes a lot of sense to use open source software as a basis. By
using already working open source software it gets a head start in the development
and can improve and change it any way it wants without having to pay a fee. This
is an even better idea in market segments where Apple is late and has to catch up
like in the browser market. Still, Apple of course is not an open source software
company: The most distinguished parts of it's operating systems are closed source
(like the user interface), lots of key and successful software is completely closed
(like iTunes) and I do not know of any open source projects that were started by
Apple in the rst place. For Apple, open source apparently is a way to improve
it's software development, to use it as a basis for some products and to improve
from inputs from open source communities.
The last interesting issue about openness is Apple's stance on standards: Clearly,
Apple in it's history never was a company promoting open standards, in fact, it
often did not care about standards at all (whether open or not) and developed
it's own computer technology, it's own operating system, built it's own device
connector standard (Firewire instead of USB) and got rid of the oppy disk drives
in it's computers when it was still an important feature in other PCs. On the
other hand there is a recent initiative that seems to promote not only standards
but open standards: Adobe's Flash technology is a proprietary de-facto standard
in the web today when it comes to video and user interaction and can of course
also be installed on Apple computers. In April 2010 Steve Jobs issued a statement
criticizing Flash and promoting the coming open HTML5 standard25 (Jobs, 2010).
Apple's mobile devices like the iPhone and the iPad also do not support Flash
but rely on special apps to deliver Flash-like content. Still, when Apple provided a
web page showing the capabilities of HTML5 with respect to Flash the demo web
25HTML is the standard to write graphical web pages for browsers. It is developed by the W3C
and versions of it are released periodically. The standard allows web page creators to develop
pages that look (almost) the same on any browser. Although there are dierences to what
extent browser vendors support the standard it is a huge success.
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site would just run on it's own Safari web browser (although many other browsers
can already display HTML5) (Otter, 2010). The further developments in this area
clearly have to be monitored.
The overall situation in terms of openness is therefore stricter in certain aspects
than Microsoft but also more open in others. This is probably due to the dierent
perspective the companies have: Microsoft is a software company and therefore
challenged by open source although compatibility or standards can have a positive
eect in certain elds, especially when the company is not the monopolist and does
not have to defend it's barrier to entry. Apple on the other hand is primarily a
hardware company that uses software to promote it's hardware sales: Open source
can therefore be a way to improve software while compatibility allows competitors
to challenge Apple's premier technology and is therefore often avoided.
4.3. Google
4.3.1. Web Search
The history of Google started in 1995 on the campus at Stanford University where
the would-be founders of Google, Larry Page and Sergey Brin met for the rst time.
Both were graduate students in computer science and they began working on a
project they called BackRub in 1996 as part of their graduate program. Google is
therefore a lot younger than the other two companies and started in a very dierent
age of computing when the Internet was becoming more and more important. Back
then Apple was still in the midst of it's restructuring and Microsoft was trying to
nd ways into the Internet business.
Back in the day Internet search was not very advanced yet and it was pretty
hard to nd good information by typing in search queries into one of the then
leading search engines like AltaVista or Inktomi. BackRub, based on the Page-
Rank algorithm developed by Page and Brin, was set out to be much better. The
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breakthrough idea that this was based on was to rank web pages by it's import-
ance and the importance of a web page was based on hyperlinks, connecting one
web page to another. If there are many links to a particular web page then this
web page is more important than another. And even more, a link from a more
important page gives more importance to the linked page than from a less im-
portant page. With this (recursive) idea one can rank pages on the Internet and
therefore drastically improve the results for a web search. The BackRub project
led to a full web search page that was available on the Stanford campus in 1997
and became popular immediately. Later the same year the name was changed to
the now familiar "Google\, a misspelling of the word "googol\ which stands for
the number of one followed by one hundred zeros.
Quickly the search engine became so popular at Stanford that the project needed
better and more computers to suit the demand for search queries. The techno-
logy was under way to be patented and Brin and Page tried to sell licenses for
it's superior technology to search engine companies. But none of the rms were
interested, not even Altavista which back then was the best and most successful
search company and Brin and Page were willing to sell at a modest price. In the
end, both were convinced that they had to start their own business to bring their
search engine to the market but the funding was a huge problem at rst as many
did not view search as an important Internet application and it was not clear yet
how to make money with web search.
This changed in 1998, just shortly before Google ran out of cash when Andy
Berchtolsheim, co-founder of Sun and successful technology investor met with Brin
and Page and was so excited about the idea that he handed over a check worth
$100,000 to "Google Inc.\, a company that hasn't even been created yet. This
made Brin and Page decide to take a leave from Stanford to start Google Inc.
Google was already very popular although it was still not a nished product and
it was not advertised anywhere. In late 1998 it was even included in the Top 100
web sites in the PC Magazine. Still, Google again almost ran out of money in
1999 but due to the great technology Brin and Page were able to get $25 million
from venture capital rms Sequoia Capital and Kleiner Perkins and still kept the
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majority of the company.
The capital allowed Google to grow remarkably in that time (1999-2000), both in
terms of personal but especially in terms of computing power. Instead of buying
and building up huge super computers they built networks of smaller and cheaper
computers, trimming those computers to the minimum to save electricity. Furter-
more, they used Linux as the operating system for their servers, avoiding license
fees. The whole computer system therefore was very ecient in terms of computing
power per dollar which gave Google an advantage. Redundancy was also a very
important feature in Google's computer network such that one computer or even
one cluster could fail without aecting the operation.
4.3.2. Advertising
Still, with all the new capital, the growth of the customer base and the search index,
it was clear that being protable was a problem for the company. The initial plan
was to license the technology to other web-based companies but in 2000 only Red
Hat and Netscape did use it for their products. It seemed that nobody was willing
to pay for the service although it was very successful already. Although Brin and
Page did not have a high opinion on advertising in the search business and there
was always the problem of how to avoid the results being skewed to advertising
partners they nally decided in 2000 that it was still the best way of making money
and they also could keep the search service for free.
The way Google used advertising was still unconventional at that time: It did not
use any advertising on the main page (this is still the case today) even though
this is the page that is viewed most. It further did not use any banners, graphics
or popups but text-only ads. And it separated advertising from search results
calling the former "Sponsored Links\ and made sure that the advertising did not
interfere with it's free search service. Google called it's program AdWords and
oered an automated way for businesses to do advertising at Google. Advertising
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was even ranked by relevance (just like with the search results) and in that way
both the usefulness of the advertising links as well as the advertising revenue were
optimized. The system was more like a continuous auction where prices for ads on
certain keywords were determined by the willingness to pay of the advertisers. Some
keywords were therefore more expensive than others, reecting the importance of
the keyword to Google's advertising partners. However, the company oering most
for an ad on a certain keyword did not guarantee the top spot in the "Sponsored
Links\ list because the relevance of the ad was always taken into account, too. The
advertising system would later be opened to the web, meaning that web masters
could sign up at Google and be a partner by including Google's ads in it's web
page, sharing the revenue with Google.
The same year Google announced it would provide online search for Yahoo and
that by assembling an index of over 1 billion URLs it became the largest search
engine in the world. Even more importantly: In a study 99% of the participants
identied Google as the best search engine. In 2001 Google expanded the search
service to include images and expanded the scope of the business by translating
the website in many dierent languages (72 by 2002) and by putting in a lot of
eort to gain advertising customers worldwide. Many worldwide oces opened in
the next years, including Tokyo (2001), Sidney (2002) and Dublin (2004). In 2002
Google announced that it would also provide web search for AOL, The New York
Times and Amazon, further increasing Google's user base. Around that time "to
google\ found a place in English dictionaries meaning to do Internet search. In
2003 Google expanded it's scope even further, introducing Google News, a search
engine for news around the web.
Having the products and business plan in place Google started making prot for
the rst time in 2001: $7 million which increased to $ 100 million in 2002. Given
the fact that Google became very protable and that it was originally funded by
venture capital rms and other investors and that many employees had stock in the
company, there was a lot of pressure to make Google a publicly traded company.
Although the founders seemingly preferred to stay private, the decision was made
to go public in 2004. In the rst half of 2004 prots were even up to $ 143 million,
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so there was lots of demand for the initial public oering.
4.3.3. Product Diversity
In that time during the public oering Google became more than a specialized
search and advertising company, it became a broad software company. At Google
employees were encouraged to use one day a week to work on a separate project
of interest. This did not have to be a marketable idea but if it was then Google
would make it an ocial project. The cash ow it received from it's search and
advertising business was used to try out many dierent projectsbut also to buy
other start-ups and integrate them into the Google universe. I will present some of
the most important products that also made them competitors to many incumbent
software and computer companies, especially Microsoft and later also Apple.
In 2004 Google launched GMail, a free web based email service that immediately
became a competitor to Microsoft, Yahoo and others. The major innovation was
to oer huge amounts of webspace for those emails, starting with 1GB of storage
which at the time was 500 times the amount Microsoft oered. For Google the
service allowed them to better utilize it's huge computer network and earn even
more with advertising. But the advertising was a problem because to do advertising
with emails one has to process those emails and check which type of ads might be
protable to display to the customer. This seemingly was the rst time Google got
into problems with data privacy when commentators and customers were unsure
about how this processing was to take place, if emails were stored and cataloged
long-time, if they were even read by people at Google or the government. Google
always denied such claims and GMail still became a popular email service but
some uncertainty was created about Google's use of data. I will touch that issue
in the next subsection.
In 2002 Google started discussing a project called Google Print (later renamed
to Google Book Search). The goal was to index books present in libraries and
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make them searchable in a very general way. The rst version of the service was
launched in December 2003 and a year later Google announced the partnership
with the University of Michigan, Harvard, Stanford, Oxford and the New York
Public Library. Although scanning all those books was tricky from a technical
standpoint, the probably more challenging issue was copyrights. In 2006 Google
made works downloadable that were out of copyright but by making copyright
protected books searchable and publishing parts of those works Google moved
itself into some grey area in terms of copyright protection law. This was even
more of an issue as Google was making advertising money with those searches.
This led to infringement suits by both the American Association of Publishers
(AAP) and the Authors Guild (AG) in 2005. A settlement was reached in 2008,
allowing Google to scan, index, search and display portions of books and make out-
of-print books available for download even if those were still copyright protected
(Reed, 2009a). Google was also paying $15,500,000 to the AAP and committed
to other payments related to the digitalization of the books before the settlement
was reached and further agreed to share advertising revenue with authors and
publishers26. However, there is also criticism about that settlement, especially as
it has the potential to give Google a monopolistic advantage because potential
competitors are not subject to the same rights that are granted to Google (Reed,
2009b). Some of those issues are still to be resolved.
The rst important desktop software product by Google was a toolbar for web
browsers that was released in 2001 to allow easier access to Google's web search. In
2004 however Google challenged Microsoft by releasing Desktop Search, a software
that uses Google search technology to index and search les stored on the computer
harddisk. Although Microsoft improved it's desktop search technology in later
Windows products the free to download Desktop Search is still available.
Later in 2004 Google acquired Keyhole, renamed it to Google Earth and eventually
released the basic version for free. The software lets users search for addresses
and locations on earth and shows 2D or 3D satellite and aerial pictures of that
26More detailed information as well as original texts of the settlement and further procedures
can be found at www.googlebooksettlement.com.
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location, including historical images and other features. Just a few months later
Google released Google Maps, an online service that includes map searches and
features like a route planner or satellite images. It also allows the search for other
locations around that area, for example for hotels, restaurants or doctors. In 2007
Google added to that by announcing Google Street View which allows users to
explore neighborhoods by watching pictures made from street, usually by a car.
In 2005 Google acquired Urchin, a company that developed a web analytics soft-
ware that then became Google Analytics which allows web masters to optimize
their website by providing them information about their users or customers. With
this tool web masters can improve the marketing of their web sites, optimizing
their revenue with advertising which of course also benets Google.
In 2006 Google acquired YouTube, the most popular video sharing community on
the Internet and paid $1.65 billion in stock. YouTube is still using it's own brand
name although the community now uses Google accounts to sign up and Google's
advertising system. Although very popular it was not clear whether YouTube was
making any prots before and after the Google acquisition but it was assumed that
this was not the case until at least 2010 when analysts predicted a positive prot
(Kafka, 2010). However, real data from Google does not seem to be available. As
with Google Book Search the service is problematic in terms of copyright: Users
can upload any video they want. Even though they are informed that they are
not allowed to upload videos without permission of the copyright holders, still,
there seem to be many videos that are not permitted under copyright law. Owners
of those rights can request the deletion of the video when they nd out about
the copyright infringement though. From the point of view of Google it is not
the service that is possibly breaking the law but users who use that service. Still,
many rms sued Google and YouTube, the most notable being Viacom in 2007
over $ 1 billion in damages. In 2010 however, a US judge ruled that the service was
protected by provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (Lefkow, 2010).
Viacom decided to appeal however and the case is still ongoing.
Also in 2006 Google bought Upstartle, maker of Writely, a web-based software to
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write text similar to the desktop-based Microsoft Word. This became the basis of
Google Docs. Later that year Google introduced Google Docs and Spreadsheet,
combining Google Docs with a web-based spreadsheed application ala Microsoft
Excel. The presentation software Presentely was added in 2007 and a drawing and
a forms application would follow. Today, Google can oer a web-based portfolio of
free productivity applications, making it a competitor to Microsoft Oce. The use
of data is again questioned as all data is stored on Google servers. Of course this
makes les accessible from anywhere and easier to collaborate when people are
working on the same le, also. Google Calender is another web-based application
that allows users to store calender entries and tasks which was introduced in 2006
as well.
In 2007 Google launched the Open Handset Alliance and announced Android, an
open source operating system for mobile devices. Joining Google in that alliance
were 30 rms, Motorola, Qualcomm, HTC and T-Mobile among them. Android is
based on Linux and includes the basic operating system, a user interface and some
applications like phone or text software. The Open Handset Alliance also oers
a Software Development Kit (SDK) for programmers and software companies to
write software (Apps) for the Android operating system. Furthermore, Google
oers an Android market where developers can store their software and sell it to
Android users via Google (Google, n.d.b). Google has the same 30% transaction
fee of the price of the software like Apple (Chu, 2008). However, Android is much
more open as one can also install software without using the Android market.
The rst phone using Android and built by HTC was announced by T-Mobile in
September 2008 and many other phone making companies like Samsung, Motorola,
LG, Sony Ericsson and others followed. The platform took o which also showed
in the number of available Apps which reached about 200,000 in January 2011
(Android Market, n.d.). Since summer 2010 more Android phones are sold than
phones from Apple (Tofel, 2010).
In January 2008 Google also launched it's own web browser called Chrome, again a
free and open source product. Chrome is built on some other open source browsers
like WebKit and Firefox but also introduced some new features, for example a
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very fast JavaScript engine. Chrome is available on all major operating system
platforms and became a favorite to some users due to it's speed and security
features. Having it's own web browser gives Google more independence because it
can then shape the future of web browsing which is of course important as all of
it's business interests are on the Internet. Data about browser usage shows that
Chrome has become the third-most popular web browser (behind Internet Explorer
and Firefox) and is constantly increasing it's usage share27.
Google also acquired On2 Technologies in February 2010, creator of a high-quality
video compression software called VP8. Together with the already open audio
codec Vorbis and the open container format WebM the WebM project nanced by
Google wants to build a free and open media standard to be used on the web, in
contrast to the closed MPEG standards. Chrome, Firefox and Opera exclusively
use WebM for the new HTML 5 standard while Internet Explorer and Apple
Safari use MPEG standards as their rst choice although they can also use WebM
(Blizzard, 2010; Mills, 2010; Hachamovitch, 2010; Bankoski, 2010; Gasston, 2010).
Of course it helps that Google is controlling the web's most important video site
YouTube which also oers WebM videos (YouTube, n.d.). Whether WebM can
become the web video standard of the future remains to be seen. A problem is
that it is still not clear whether VP8 violates patents held by other companies and
if it can oer the same quality as the new MPEG standards (Daara, n.d.).
Based on it's success with the Chrome web browser Google announced the Chrome
OS project, renamed in 2009 to Chromium OS (although the product is still called
Google Chrome OS). The goal of this project is to build an open source Linux-
based operating system that is very fast and secure and allows easy Internet access.
It is not the goal to install software on it like on a conventional operating system
but applications are used via a web browser and are accessed on the web. Although
the operating system is still not used very much there is of course the possibility
that it might compete with Microsoft Windows in the future, especially if more
applications or computer usage in general shifts towards the Internet.
27Data sources and discussion can be found in the section about Microsoft and the Internet
Explorer
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The latest product that has high potential is Google TV, announced in May 2010,
a system that is built on Android and Chrome and wants to marry TV and the
web, allowing TV users to also watch web channels but also regular web sites and
social networks. Again, the system is open and Google is working with industrial
partners to get Google TV onto settop boxes and TVs and with software developers
to improve the user experience. Although it is still very early and the success of
this approach cannot be predicted as of now it adds to Google's open projects with
potential high reward in the future.
But Google also did not stay put in it's most important products, improving the
search technology, enlarging the index of web sites and improving the design of
it's web site several times. In web advertising, Google became even stronger after
acquiring DoubleClick, it's strongest competitor and leading company in "display
ads\ in November 200828. In June 2009 Google announced AdSense for Mobile,
expanding it's advertising program to mobile platforms and allowing developers
to display advertising in their mobile applications. In May 2010 Google also ac-
quired AdMob, a leading company in mobile advertising to further strengthen it's
business.
The fast pace that Google is working on projects of course also leads to failed
projects, most of them of course never leave the Googleplex or any other lab that
Google researchers and engineers are working in. One that did and still failed was
Google Wave, a service launched as a preview in May 2009 with the very optimistic
idea to revolutionize email. The service is a combination of email, collaborative
text creation, chat and social networking. However, the project was shut down
in April 2010 as Google did not see the user reception it wanted. Still, Google
announced that it wants to use parts of the product within other Google projects
and released the code as open source.
28Google announced the acquisition a year earlier but regulators stopped that process. Although
in the end the merger was allowed it clearly showed that there were concerns about dominance
in the market for web based advertising.
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4.3.4. Summary, Strategies and Openness
Google's growth from a small start-up out of the University of Stanford to one of
the biggest software companies in the world has been remarkable. Based on it's
dominance in search technology and web advertising Google has diversied it's
product base in the last several years, moving into competition with the biggest
computer companies. Google's lead in search is not primarely based on any con-
sumer lock-in but on superior technology and it's lead in advertising is based on
the ease of use and huge network size: Given the large amounts of visits to Google
and it's partner sites already very small numbers of advertising clicks and click
fees can generate a strong revenue.
Google's products are based on open source, both as a basis for it's services like
the Linux operating system and as a licensing choice for many of it's products.
Furthermore, many of Google's products and services use open standards or (if
there are none) dene some. However, the most important revenue generators for
Google, it's search technology and advertising system, are not open. In a blog post
Jonathan Rosenberg, Senior Vice President of Product Management at Google,
explains some of Google's views on openness and how it relates to it's strategies
(Rosenberg, 2009). Although arguing that "open systems win\ and that with new
products Google should use or dene open standards and open up it's source code
and interfaces Rosenberg argues that this should not hold for the two mentioned
products/services. The reasons are that the markets for search and advertising are
already very competitive and therefore opening up would not increase competition.
Furthermore, if the ranking algorithms were open people could manipulate search
results or advertising lists. Although I accept the second argument as valid I am
not sure whether so much would change because search engine optimization is
already a marketing tool on the web, even when the algorithms aren't open. I
would rather assume that opening up those technologies for which Google is almost
a monopolist would allow other companies to copy it's technologies and close the
technology gap or even just oer the same technology with a dierent design or
business plan. Clearly, Google would have a lot to lose if due to higher competition
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the trac on Google's search engine becomes lower or partner sites work with
dierent advertising providers.
The main argument by Rosenberg for opening up all those other products is sca-
le. By opening up and basically allowing other companies to use it's technology
Rosenberg argues that this leads to a lot of innovation which eventually increases
the business for everyone: "We may get a smaller piece, but it will come from a
bigger pie\. I am not sure whether this holds true in general, taking into account
that the products are for free. For Google however, this really could hold true at
least when the new technology leads to higher usage and more Internet time by
the costumers. This in turn leads to higher overall trac and quite a fraction of it
will land either at Google or on partner sites that use Google's advertising service,
generating revenue for Google.
A dierent issue is openness in terms of data: Google is a company that depends
on information and therefore also has to store lots of information. I touched on
the issue that appeared when Google started using information stored in emails
from the GMail service to display advertising. Google uses a single membership
account for all of it's services which is convenient but also raises privacy concerns.
People that use GMail, store texts and pictures and oer videos on Youtube could
be proled if that data is combined. Google therefore started issuing it's privacy
principles in January 2010 and is updating those principles on a regular basis,
claiming that the data used by Google is secure and that it will also not be shared
with other companies. Furthermore, Google Dashboard lets users control the data
that is stored by Google. Another problem appears due to Google's services that
are used on other web sites, mostly advertising and Google Analytics, that could
potentially be used to track user's surng habits. And then, search results could
in principle also be skewed to favor certain web sites.
The overall picture for Google therefore looks very clear: Google is an open com-
pany and it is also very open in saying that it is protable for them. Interestingly
enough that the most important parts of it's business are not open even though
they are for free (web search) or open in terms of letting partner sites participate
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(advertising). The story for Google's success is therefore a story about external
revenue, a perspective that I will discuss in more detail below. Whether Google
can stay that open forever or if this is just a temporary strategy as long as the
advertising business is working well is of course yet to be seen.
4.4. Summary
Reviewing the history of the three mentioned companies shows that the strategies
in terms of openness are not only dierent but they also changed over time. Mi-
crosoft's early success is based on portability and IBM's open platform but then
it built up a software barrier to entry to monopolize the operating system market
and used it's closed operating system monopoly to take over other markets as well
oering closed products, interfaces and standards. Although this strategy proved
successful the legal problems might force Microsoft to change it's approach to open-
ness and some signs already point in a more open future (see above). That some
of it's most important products might not be as important in the future due to
technological change might also force Microsoft to further evaluate it's strategy.
Apple on the other hand has always been a closed company due to the fact that
it sees itself primarely as a hardware company. For Apple software and services
are ways to improve hardware sales such that a closed approach (no compatibility
with other products, dierent interfaces and standards) seems optimal. That Apple
nevertheless sometimes uses and works with open source software can also be
understood in this way because it allows Apple to improve it's oers by giving the
company a head start in certain developments (operating systems, web browsers).
However, a necessary condition for this approach seems to be a lead in technology
(e.g. quality of products) because otherwise customers can choose the product with
the better compatibility (see above for the crisis in the 1990s).
Google on the other hand has always been an open company, driven by the external
revenue generated by it's advertising business. The major exception to this strategy
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is it's search algorithm which is not an open technology although other companies
can license it. The strategy makes sense for Google as due to it's strength in
advertising revenues grow with the overall Internet usage and not with Google's
market share in any particular market. It will be interesting to monitor whether




The economic analysis of some of the issues and topics presented in the last section
will be done by using a game theoretic model with several stages. Taking into
account suggestions from related work I develop a duopoly model that combines
vertical product dierentiation with an incumbent-entrant-scheme and featuring
some network economics based on and inspired by the model by Baake and Boom
(2001). Although I do not fully solve the model for all possible parameter values
due to it's complexity, I show that I can discuss a wide range of topics related to
openness by altering certain details and parameters of the model.
5.1. The Model
5.1.1. General Methodology
In this model there are two rms (i = 1; 2) that compete in a market for consumers
that have a certain valuation for the products (I also use the word systems) of those
rms. Firm 1 is the incumbent that has already been able to sell N1 of it's systems
in the past29. Firm 2 has developed a dierent system that is not compatible to the
rst one and can enter the market to compete with the incumbent. Furthermore,
given the topic to discuss, the potential entrant also has other options which I will
discuss later. Note that the development of the second system is exogenous as well
so I do not explain how rm 2 got the innovation, one can assume it to come from a
research or development project. Firms then set prices competitively and oer the
products to the consumers. In the last stage consumers decide whether to buy one
of the two systems or no system at all. The result of the model is a subgame-perfect
equilibrium meaning that the decisions are optimal in all stages for all rms and
consumers given the decisions of the other consumers and the other rm. Note
29Of course, one could also endogenize how the incumbent sold those systems in an additional
stage but I believe this does not add much insight to the model.
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that I am only discussing pure-strategy equilibria. Firms are able to assess what
will happen in following stages and base their decisions on that information. The
model can therefore be solved using backwards induction and an equilibrium is
subgame-perfect if in every stage an equilibrium is played. In this type of model
for general settings of parameter values not only dierent equilibria can occur
but also non-unique equilibria or no equilibrium at all. I will now formalize the
properties of the dierent stages of the model.
5.1.2. Stage 1: Licensing Decision
In the rst step, rm 2 has to decide what to do with the technology, given that rm
1 is the current monopolist. Firm 2 can use the technology for it's own purposes
which is the standard case. In certain topics rm 2 can also oer a license to the
current monopolist or release it as open source.
If the technology is used by the company itself, it can enter the market in the next
stage and compete against rm 1. Prices, revenues and prots of the now duopoly
market are determined in later stages. Licensing gives the rm a prot of 2 = T ,
a xed license fee that it gets from rm 1. Firm 1 then stays monopolist and earns
the monopoly prot minus the license fee. I assume that rm 1 will always agree
to the licensing oer if the fee is lower or equal to the (positive) dierence in
prots for rm 1. I assume that there are no other licensing options (e.g. volume
based licensing) and by selling the license rm 2 grants an exclusive right to it's
technology to rm 1 so that it cannot produce on it's own.
Releasing the system as open source means that the technology is opened to the
public and everybody can use it for free. This can be optimal for rm 2 if either
it cannot make a prot by entering or if the goal is not to maximise the prot
or if the revenue comes from an external source. I will elaborate more on those
situations below.
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Depending on the situation I assume dierent cost structures:
1. As described in the very rst section systems in information technology tend
to have large xed costs and relatively small variable costs and this holds true
even stronger for software systems than for hardware. I therefore normalize
the variable costs to zero and this is equal for all rms that produce systems.
2. Furthermore, I assume that the incumbent has already paid any xed cost
before entering the market (before this game has started).
3. However, I assume that there are other positive xed costs, depending on the
situation: F1 are the xed costs that rm 1 has to pay if it takes over the new
technology via a licensing agreement. Most of those costs can be interpreted
as costs to make the technology compatible to their own technology such
that the existing network can be preserved30. F2 are the xed costs for rm
2 if it enters the market in stage 2. Those can be costs for advertising, docu-
mentation, support or even a production facility (for example for installation
discs).
4. If rm 2 just releases it's technology as open source for example on the
Internet without actually marketing or supporting it's product, then the
costs probably go to or are close to zero. Therefore, I assume that an open
source release is costless.
5.1.3. Stage 2: Entry Decision
If rm 2 chooses not to license and not to open source it's technology then it
can use the technology to build a product and enter the market. It has to decide
between 2 options here, taking into account what will happen in the next stages
of the game.
30The term "network\ be will dened later.
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1. Stay out of the market: 2 = 0
2. Enter the market and compete against the other rm: 2 = p2z2   F2
p2 is the price set by rm 2 in stage 2 while z2 is the number of systems sold
(or number of consumers who bought that system) in stage 3. I will also call z2
the "network\ of rm 2 while N1 is the existing network and z1 is the additional
network for rm 1. Staying out of the market in this stage is of course only optimal
if the xed costs are so high that they cannot be earned by the revenue that is
earned in the later stages. If there was a licensing agreement in stage 1 or rm 2
opted to release it's product as open source then this stage is skipped.
5.1.4. Stage 3: Pricing Decision
If rm 2 enters, there is a duopoly market and both rms set prices competitively.
An equilibrium is reached if the prices are mutually optimal given the price of
the other rm. The prot for rm 1 is 1 = 1 = p1z1 in this case with p1 the
equilibrium price of rm and z1 the network of rm 1.
If rm 2 does not enter and also did not license the system or open source it, then
rm 1 is a monopolist in the old technology with the same prot function as above.
If rm 1 licenses the technology by rm 2 it is also monopolist but the prot is
then 1 = 1   F1   T , the revenue minus the xed costs that come from using
the new technology and minus the licensing fee that goes to rm 2.
In the open source case rm 1 has to compete with a product that is oered at
zero price: p2 = 0. The prot is again 1 = 1 = p1z1 although the price and
network most likely will be dierent than in the competitive case. The prots of
both rms in the dierent cases will be discussed in more detail below.
Note on the notation: i is the overall prot by rm i that also includes all xed
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costs while i is the revenue for rm i (the prot if the game would only consist
of stages 3 and 4).
5.1.5. Stage 4: Consumer Choice
Consumers are dierentiated in the way they view the systems: All consumers
value one system over another but have a dierent willingness to pay. I dene
utility functions for up to two system (i = 1; 2):
Ui = six+ (Ni + zi)  pi
and U = 0 if no system is bought. si is the quality of system i, Ni the number
of systems i that have been sold already or the already installed network for that
system31, zi the number of systems i that are sold in this stage and pi the price of
system i. Users are dierentiated in terms of their willingness to pay for quality
and are independently and identically distributed: x  [0; 1]. Consumers buy the
system that gives them the most utility or no system at all if the utility for both
systems is negative.
One can clearly see the dierent features of the model in these utility functi-
ons: Vertical dierentiation among products, the network economics part and an
incumbent-entrant structure. An equilibrium in this stage is dened by a set of
networks (z1; z2) such that no single consumer has an incentive to switch it's sys-
tem choice by changing the network or dropping out of it. The network economics
nature of those utility functions allows for many dierent equilibria and multiple
equilibria can also occur given the choice of model parameters.
31I always assume N2 = 0 so that if rm 2 is in the market it has no existing network.
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5.1.6. Dierences to the Original Model
I just want to quickly summerize the major dierences to the model by Baake and
Boom:
1. I do not assume that both rms come into the market at the same time but
that one rm is already in the market and has already built up a network.
2. The other model endogenizes the quality decision of the rms while I ass-
ume that this is done exogenously before the game starts. Each rm has a
technology/development at hand and can use it in a way the model allows
it.
3. In the other model there are marginal costs that are proportional to the
quality of the product and no xed costs. I assume some xed costs but
neglect marginal costs.
4. The consumer model does not assume increasing network returns to system
quality but instead the network eect is independent of the "quality eect\
and vice versa. Baake and Boom do not give any explanation or reason for
their assumption such that it makes sense in my opinion to leave the two
eects independent of each other in the utility functions for the consumers.
5. Baake and Boom discuss compatibility and quality decisions by the rms
while in this model more general decisions about openness can be discussed.
5.1.7. Parameter and Decision Choices
The model allows for many dierent parameter combinations that lead to dierent
equilibria in dierent stages. I therefore restrict the parameter space a little by
using the following assumptions:
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I assume that the technology by the potential entrant is better than the one by
the incumbent and the other technology is normalized to a quality of 1: s1 = 1 and
s2 = s > 1. In terms of the network eect I further assume
1
2
<  < 1 such that the
marginal utility from the network is lower than the utility of the system quality.
Furthermore, I restrict s >  + 1
1  such that the quality dierence is relatively
large. Note that the restriction enforces s > 1 automatically. The assumptions lead
to unique equilibria in stage 4 but also facilitate the process of nding equilibria
in stage 3 which will be shown below.
5.2. Stage 4: Consumer Decision
As the model will be solved using backwards induction I start with the analysis
of the last stage. The topics I discuss later on using the full model have the same
properties with respect to stage 4 and therefore the solutions here can be used as
general results for all topics. The decisions in the earlier stages are already xed in
this stage, meaning that the licensing and entry decisions were already made and
that prices were already picked in stage 3. Therefore, in stage 4 there are either 1
or 2 systems in the market and the prices of those products are xed. Consumers
decide on which system to buy (if any) given those prices and given the choices of
the other consumers.
5.2.1. Two Systems
If there are two systems for the consumers to choose from with prices (p1; p2) then
there are 7 dierent equilibria that can be played by the consumers. I number
the equilibria from 1a, 1b to 4 with the following notation: An "a\ equilibrium is
an equilibrium where there are consumers who do not buy any system while for
"b\ equilibria the full market is served. The number in the beginning denotes the
sharing of the market (same notation as Baake and Boom): In equilibria 1a and 1b
both rms sell system while in equilibrium 2a/2b only rm 1 sells and in 3a/3b only
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rm 2. In equilibrium 4 consumers do not buy any system. Equilibria are dened
by the number of sold systems (z1; z2) such that zi  0 and z1 + z2  1 holds.
The dierent equilibria are summarized in Table 1 together with the restriction
on prices (if applicable). Restrictions on prices means that certain equilibria only
occur in certain ranges of (p1; p2) and furthermore certain inequalities have to hold.
I will now formally show the properties and conditions for the dierent equilibria.
In equilibrium 1a (z1 > 0; z2 > 0; z1 + z2 < 1) both systems are sold: System 1 is
sold to the consumers with low quality valuation and system 2 to the ones with
high quality valuation and there are also consumers who do not buy any system.
Due to the nature of the utility functions the space of the consumer valuation is
partitioned by two distinct points x1; x2 with z1 = x2   x1 and z2 = 1   x2 that
are dened as follows:
U1(x1) = 0 : x1 + N1 + z1   p1 = 0
U1(x2) = U2(x2) : x2 + N1 + z1   p1 = sx2 + z2   p2
This is a set of linear equations for x1 and x2 given (p1; p2). If now 0 < x1 < x2 < 1
then this constitutes an equilibrium as every consumer does best given the choice
of the other consumers. All consumers with x2  x  1 buy system 2, consumers
with x1  x < x2 buy system 1 and consumers with x < x1 don't buy at all.
I assume that indierent consumers (either x = x1 or x = x2) buy the system
with the higher quality. The restrictions on x1 and x2 lead to three restrictions
on (p1; p2) and combining these restrictions also enforces a necessary condition for
the range of both prices where this equilibrium can occur (see Table 1).
Equilibrium 1b (z1 > 0; z2 > 0; z1 + z2 = 1) is similar to 1a but the full market is
served. Therefore, for x = 0 the utility function for system 1 has to be nonnegative.
z1 = x2 and z2 = 1   x2 and 0 < x2 < 1 has to hold for this equilibrium. x2 and
the price restrictions are determined by:
U1(0)  0 : N1 + z1   p1  0
U1(x2) = U2(x2) : x2 + N1 + z1   p1 = sx2 + z2   p2
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This is an equilibrium if 0 < x2 < 1 and then all consumers with 0  x < x2 buy
system 1 and those with x2  x  1 buy system 2.
In equilibrium 2a (0 < z1 < 1; z2 = 0) only system 1 is sold and no consumer buys
system 2. For this to happen, the utility function for system 1 has to always be
larger than the one for system 2, such that even the consumer with the highest
valuation of quality (x = 1) buys system 1. Then, z1 = 1   x1 for 0 < x1 < 1
and:
U1(x1) = 0 : x1 + N1 + z1   p1 = 0
U1(1)  U2(1) : 1 + N1 + z1   p1  s  p2
If 0 < x1 < 1 holds then this is an equilibrium and all consumers with x1  x  1
buy system 1.
In the 2b equilibrium (z1 = 1; z2 = 0) again only the rst system is sold but now
all consumers buy that system. This happens if the consumers with the lowest
valuation of quality (x = 0) also has a non-negative utility:
U1(0)  0 : N1 +    p1  0
U1(1)  U2(1) : 1 + N1 +    p1  s  p2
The rst inequality already denes the price range for rm 1 while the second
denes a price restriction.
In equilibrium 3a (z1 = 0; 0 < z2 < 1) only the second system is sold while no
one buys system 1 and some consumers don't buy at all. For this to happen, the
utility function for system 2 has to be always larger than the one for system 1
whenever the utility function for system 2 is nonnegative. Then, z2 = 1   x2 for
0 < x2 < 1:
U2(x2) = 0 : sx2 + z2   p2 = 0
U1(x2)  0 : x2 + N1   p1  0
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If 0 < x2 < 1 holds then this is an equilibrium and all consumers with x2  x  1
buy system 2.
Equilibrium 3b (z1 = 0; z2 = 1) is similar but the full market is served:
U2(0)  0 :    p2  0
U1(0)  U2(0) : N1   p1     p2
Equilibrium 4 (z1 = 0; z2 = 0) is the one where no consumer buys anything. This
happens if the utility functions are smaller than or equal to 0 in the full range of
x, or equivalent, for the consumer with the highest valuation of quality (x = 1):
U1(1)  0 : 1 + N1   p1  0
U2(1)  0 : s  p2  0
In this case there is no price restriction but the inequalities already show the price
ranges (again, see Table 1).
Proposition 1. For any price combination (p1; p2) an equilibrium in the consumer
stage exists and this equilibrium is always unique.
Proof. If both p1  N1 + 1 and p2  s then an equilibrium always exists as
then the consumers play equilibrium 4. If one of the two inequalities is not fullled
then one of the other equilibria is played: If p2 > s   1 then either 1a, 2a or 2b
are played depending on p1. As the three price restrictions make up the full range
of possible values for p1 (which can easily be checked by inspecting Table 1) an
equilibrium always has to exist. For  < p2  s   1 1a, 1b, 2b or 3a are played
and again, the price restrictions make up the full range of values for p1. The same
is true for p2   when 1b, 2b or 3b are played. Therefore, for every p2 any p1
always leads to an equilibrium which proves that an equilibrium always exists for
any price combination.
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The proof for the uniqueness of the equilibria is shown in the appendix. The crucial
assumption for the proof is that s >  + 1
1  meaning that the dierence between
qualities has to be strong enough. This qualitatively replicates the result by Baake
and Boom in that stage.
5.2.2. One System
When only incumbent rm 1 is in the market selling to consumers then consumers
only have to choice to decide between buying that one system or not buying at all.
The quality of the incumbent's system is a general t which could be the original
technology of the incumbent (t = 1) but also the technology of rm 2 if licensed
(t = s). The situation is less complex as there are only three equilibria in this
case.
In equilibrium 1 (0 < z1 < 1) some consumers buy the system while others don't.
Given the nature of the utility function there has to be an x1 with 0 < x1 < 1 and
then z1 = 1  x1:
U1(x1) = 0 : tx1 + N1 + z1   p1 = 0
This leads to x1 =
1
t p1   t N1   t  and the restrictions and price range are
given by 0 < x1 < 1 to N1 +  < p1 < N1 + t. z1 = 1  x1 =  p1+N1+tt  .
In equilibrium 2 (z1 = 1) the full market is served which means that even the
consumer with the lowest valuation of quality has a non-negative utility:
U1(0)  0 : N1 +    p1  0
This leads to p1  N1 + .
In the case of equilibrium 3 (z1 = 0) no consumer buys which means that even the
83
5.3 Operating System Licensing 5 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
consumer with the highest valuation has a non-positive utility:
U1(1)  0 : t+ N1   p1  0
The price range is therefore p1  N1 + t.
Proposition 2. For any price p1 an equilibrium in the consumer stage exists and
it is also unique.
Proof. By inspection of the price ranges it is already clear that the equilibria are
unique for any values of t,  and N1. Furthermore, any price p1  0 leads to an
equilibrium as the unication of the price ranges makes up the full range.
5.3. Operating System Licensing
I now turn to solving the full model for certain cases of interest. One interesting
issue that can be analyzed with this model is the licensing of systems/technologies
in information technology. One story that comes to mind is the competition in
the 1980s when Microsoft had the dominant operating system that was sold on
all IBM-type PCs at that time when Apple developed the MacIntosh with a new
operating system, including a graphical user interface and many other features that
were new for personal computers32. The new operating system was so advanced
that Microsoft needed until the early to mid 1990s (Windows 3.1 or Windows
95) to include the same features and even asked Apple to license their operating
system to other vendors, realizing that it was way better than DOS. Still, Apple
did not do it because they saw itself as a hardware company and believed that the
better operating system should boost Apple hardware sales.
I analyse this situation using the model at hand. Here, Microsoft is the incumbent
(rm 1) and has an already set up network size N1. Apple is rm 2 and has the
32There were earlier developments similar to the MacIntosh but they were sold at a much higher
price. The details of that story can be read above in the section about Apple's history.
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better product quality (s2 = s >  +
1
1  > 1 = s1). The network part of the
model is the software developed for the respective system much like the standard
approach taken by related papers (for example Church and Gandal (1992)). I use
the analysis of the fourth stage from above and solve the rest of the model using
those results.
In stage 1 rm 2 has to decide whether to oer a licensing contract to rm 1. If also
rm 1 agrees then rm 1 is the monopolist with the new techology with quality s
and has to pay xed costs F1 > 0 to make the system compatible to it's existing
network N1. When T > 0 is the licensing fee then
L   1  T + F1
maxf2   F2; 0g  T
has to hold such that licensing is optimal for both rms. L denotes the monopoly
revenue for a monopolist by selling quality s when it licenses rm 2's technology and
i is the revenue for rm i when there was no licensing agreement. The conditions
mean that both rms have to be better o with this licensing agreement which
depends on whether rm 2 would enter in stage 2 or not.
If there was no licensing agreement then rm 2 has to decide whether to enter
the market and sell quality s or stay out. The xed costs F2 > 0 to enter have
to be paid in this stage. Clearly, entering is only optimal when the revenue is at
least equal to those xed costs. Those revenues therefore decide whether rm 2 can
enter the market with it's own technology and whether licensing is protable.
5.3.1. Stage 3
Given the dierent options in stages 1 and 2 there are three possibilities: Firm
1 could be a monopolist with the worse (no licensing and no market entry) or
better (licensing) technology or there could be a duopoly market with both rms
selling their own technology. Firms maximize their prots given the price of the
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other rm (in the duopoly case) and the equilibria that are played in stage 4 by
the consumers. A vector (p1; p2) is an equilibrium in this stage (subgame) if the
pricing decisions are mutually optimal for both rms, meaning that p1 optimizes
the prot of rm 1 given p2 and vice versa. If only the incumbent is active in the
market, then an equilibrium is dened by a price p1 that maximizes rm 1's prot.
Note that as costs are xed optimizing the prot is equivalent to optimizing the
revenue dened by i = pizi (i = 1; 2).
Proposition 3. If the incumbent is a monopolist in this stage selling quality s to
the consumers (the licensed technology from rm 2) then the optimal prices depend
on the relationship between N1 and s. If N1 is low relative to s then only part of
the market will be served while if N1 is relatively large then a price is charged such









2(s ) , 1 =
(N1+s)2
4(s )
2. N1  s 2 : p1 = N1 + , z1 = 1, 1 = N1 + 
Proof. Analyzing the three possible equilibria in stage 4 and it's price ranges shows
that for p1  N1 + s the revenue is zero (as no consumer buys the system) and
for p1  N1 +  the revenue is equal to p1 as every consumers buys the system
(z1 = 1). In between there is a quadratic revenue function with 1 =
 p1+N1+s
s  p1
that has a unique maximum at p1 =
N1+s
2
. This is always smaller than N1 + s
such that equilibrium 3 (z1 = 0) is never played. Playing equilibrium 2 (z1 = 1) is
optimal if the maximum point of the quadratic function is outside it's price region.
Then, the optimal price for rm 1 is right at the border with p1 = N1 +  as
the combined revenue function at that point is downward sloping both to the left
(linear, equilibrium 2) and to the right (quadratic, equilibrium 1). This is the case
if N1+s
2
 N1 +  which leads to N1  s 2 . It is of course intuitive that the
stronger the already existing network the more likely it is that it is protable for
rm 1 to serve the whole market, holding the other parameters constant.
Proposition 4. If the incumbent is a monopolist in this stage selling quality 1 to
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the consumers (it's own technology) then it is always optimal to serve the whole
market. Formally: p1 = N1 + , z1 = 1, 1 = N1 + .
Proof. The proof is similar to the one above but here a price to serve only part
of the market is only optimal for N1 <
1 2

< 0 as 1
2
<  < 1. Therefore for any
N1 > 0 it is always optimal to serve the full market if quality is 1.
Proposition 5. If both rms are in the market in stage 3 selling their own systems
to the consumers then the optimal prices again depend on the relationship between
N1 and s. If N1 is relatively low then there is no equilibrium in real strategies.
For high N1 the incumbent with the lower product quality can keep the entrant out
of the market and sell it's product to all consumers. For values of N1 that are in
between both rms sell their systems and the full market is served. Formally:
1. N1  2s 3 2 : p2 = z2 = 2 = 0, p1 = 1 = N1   s+  + 1, z1 = 1
2. N1  N1 < 2s 3 2 : (p1; p2) = (N1+s 3 13 ;  N1+2s 3 23 )





3. N1 < N1: No equilibrium in pure strategies
For the minimal N1 for which a pure strategy price equilibrium is possible
(s 3 1)2
(2s 3 2)  N1  s 3 12 has to hold.
Proof. The formal proof is shown in the appendix. Note that the price equilibria
lead to a situation such that only consumer equilibria 1b (market sharing, full
market served) or 2b (only system 1 is sold to the full market) are played in
stage 4. The reason is due to the fact that if consumer equilibria 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b
and 4 are played at least one of the two rms does not sell anything. Therefore,
rms will choose a dierent price whenever possible. The 2b equilibrium therefore
only appears for high values of N1 for which the second rm cannot set another
positive price to do better given rm 1's optimal price (see appendix). Such a
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situation however does not exist for the other consumer equilibria in this group.
A price vector such that consumer equilibrium 1a will be played does not exist
because due to the relatively strong network eect it is never optimal for rm 1.
Setting a price such that equilibrium 1b (market sharing) is played is optimal for
a relatively wide range of values of N1 but it breaks down for very low values such
that no equilibrium exists there.
5.3.2. Stage 2
Using the results of stage 3 one can derive a condition to entry for rm 2 in stage
2:
Proposition 6. If the existing network for rm 1 and the entry cost for rm 2
are relatively small then it is optimal for rm 2 to enter the market, otherwise it




has to hold such that
rm 2 enters the market.
Proof. Given that in stage 3 a value of N1  2s 3 2 leads to zero prots for rm
2 it can never be optimal to enter in that case. If N1 is lower, then there is an
equilibrium in stage 3 that leads to market sharing in stage 4 such that the revenue
is positive and equal to 2 =
( N1+2s 3 2)2
9(s 2 1) (see Proposition 5). This revenue has
to be greater than the xed cost and solving F2  ( N1+2s 3 2)29(s 2 1) for N1 leads to
the expression above.
Note that due to this entry condition the only equilibrium that will be played
in the duopoly case in stage 4 is the 1b equilibrium as for the 2b equilibrium
rm 2 would not enter the market. The result shows that N1 and F2 make rm 1
tougher in a sense that a high value deters entry. This is comparable to the general
approach taken by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) about over- or underinvestment
(in a very general meaning) deterring entry by making the incumbent tough in the
following stages. In this model there is no endogenous investment but N1 and F2
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are exogenous variables that however have the same eect as the investments in
the classication by Fudenberg and Tirole.
5.3.3. Stage 1
The analysis of the equilibria in stage 1 depends on the entry decision in stage
2:
Proposition 7. If rm 2 cannot enter the market in stage 2, agreeing on a licen-
sing agreement in stage 1 is only optimal for both rms if the existing network and
the compatibility cost for rm 1 are relatively small: N1 <
s 2

and F1  (N1+s)24(s )  





the rst inequality do not contradict each other only for F2 >
(s  2)2
9(s 2 1) . For the
licensing fee 0  T  (N1+s)2
4(s )   N1      F1 holds.
Proof. As rm 2 cannot enter the market in stage 2 licensing is always optimal
for any T  0. By licensing the better technology rm 1 can earn N1 +  if
N1  s 2 and (N1+s)
2
4(s ) if N1 <
s 2

(see Proposition 3) and N1 +  by staying
monopolist with it's own technology (see Proposition 4). The dierence in those
revenues has to be larger than the compatibility cost F1 > 0 plus the licensing fee
T geq0. Clearly, for N1  s 2 the dierence in revenues is zero such that this is
not possible. Licensing can therefore only be optima for a smaller N1 and F1 can
only be as large as the dierence in revenues. The licensing fee that the two rms
agree on is then between zero and the revenue dierence minus compatibility cost
which leads to the inequality above.
For the situation when rm 2 can enter the market the following lemma is nee-
ded:
Lemma 1. For a wide range of values of existing network N1 the revenue for a
monopolist that sells products with quality s is greater than the combined industry
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revenues of a duopoly when one rm sells quality s and the other rm quality 1
and this can be shown for N1  s 3 12 . Althoughthis is not the minimal N1 for
which the lemma holds it cannot be shown for other values N1  N1  s 3 12 .






while the combined industry revenue is (N1+s 3 1)
2+( N1+2s 3 2)2
9(s 2 1)
(see Propositions 3 to 5). Note that for N1 <
s 2

, N1+ is a lower bound for the
actual revenue function (N1+s)
2
4(s ) . Comparing prices shows that the monopoly price
N1+ is greater than both duopoly prices as long asN1 >
s 3 1
2
. As in both cases
the full market is served also the monopoly revenue has to be always greater. This
is the case for N1  s 2 but also for s 3 12  N1 < s 2 as (N1+s)
2




. One can also assume that the monopoly prot is greater for at least
some values in N1 < N1 <
s 3 1
2
as N1+ is still greater than the lower duopoly
price and the actual revenue (N1+s)
2
4(s ) is even higher than N1 + . To calculate





9(s 2 1) which cannot be reasonably
solved for a general N1.
Proposition 8. If rm 2 can enter the market in stage 2, agreeing on a licensing
agreement is optimal for both rms if the dierence between the compatibility cost
and the market entry cost is not too large and it is always optimal if the market
entry cost is larger than the compatibility cost. Formally:






: F1   F2  (N1+s)24(s )   (N1+s 3 1)
2+( N1+2s 3 2)2
9(s 2 1)
Proof. If rm 2 can enter the market in stage 2 then 2 F2 > 0 and the conditions
L   1  T + F1 and 2   F2  T can be combined to L   (1 + 2)  F1   F2:
The dierence between the monopoly revenue to the total duopoly revenues has to
be larger than the dierence of the compatibility cost for rm 1 and the entry cost
for rm 2. Due to Lemma 1 for N1  s 3 12 the left hand side is positive such that
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licensing is always optimal if the compatibility cost for rm 1 is lower than the entry
cost for rm 2. Furthermore, it is also optimal whenever the dierence between
the two is small enough. Plugging in the revenue functions from Proposition 3 to
5 leads to the inequalities shown above.
5.3.4. Summary
The analysis shows that there are two ways such that licensing can be optimal:
When rm 2 cannot enter the market it is still optimal when rm 1's existing
network and the compatibility cost are relatively low. The intuition behind this
result is that for a large existing network N1 rm 1 is not better o by being a
monopolist with the better technology. The compatibility cost has to be lower than
the dierence in the monopoly prots for the two technologies. On the other hand
when rm 2 can enter the market licensing is optimal when the compatibility cost
is not much larger than the market-entry cost or even lower. Then the rms will
always agree to license the technology (this can only be shown for N1  s 3 12
though).
There are therefore three possible equilibria in the complete game: Both rms
agree on a licensing contract in stage 1 and then rm 1 acts as a monopolist in
stage 3 to either serve the full market if the existing network is high or serve only
part of the market otherwise. When there is no licensing and rm 2 does not enter
then the same is true in stages 3 and 4 although then rm 1 always serves the full
market and makes less prots when the existing network is small. If rm 2 does
enter however in stage 2 then there is a duopoly competition in prices in stage
3 and consumers play equilibrium 1b (full market served and market sharing) in
stage 4. Unfortunately, in this model the results break down for low values of N1
as then there is no pure strategy duopoly equilibrium in stage 3 and then revenues
cannot be compared between the dierent strategies.
Going back to the Apple vs Microsoft story it might seem that licensing would
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have been a good strategy for Apple as it was able to enter the market and then
the model suggests that licensing is almost always optimal. The compatibility cost
however might have been too high compared to the entry cost but in reality Mi-
crosoft wanted Apple to open up it's technology so that is not a good explanation.
The question of course is whether Apple did even consider licensing before ente-
ring the market. In that case this model does not explain the situation very well
as in a sense Apple restricted it's strategy space and basically jumped over the
decision in stage 1 to just decide whether to enter or not. In this circumstance the
model (from stage 2 onwards) is only able to explain the market sharing after the
entry decision when Apple was only able to gain a small market share (with high
revenues however) due to the existing software network of Microsoft. What also
has to be taken into account is that Apple not only sold their operating system
but also hardware. To t reality better one would have to introduce a factor into
the revenue equations that reects the fact that rm 2 also has hardware sales
while rm 1 does not. In that case licensing is less likely due to the fact that the
second rm also loses some of it's hardware revenues when it agrees to a licensing
contract. Furthermore, the game at hand is a one-shot game which does not take
into account dynamic eects such that rm 2 could build up a strong network over
time which might have been a strategy for Apple as well. If that was the case then
it was clearly not a successful one as Microsoft was able to catch up in quality and
Apple was never able to challenge Microsoft's network.
5.4. Open Source: Market Entry
Another topic that can be discussed using the model is open source software.
Although the topic is very broad I want to show that some parts can be modeled
in this framework. Using the studies by Lerner and Tirole, I take three classes of
arguments and try to capture them with the model at hand. The rst one is the
argument that software might be made open source whenever it is probable that
the software would not be protable on the market. The second class of arguments
are the signaling incentives like future job opportunities and access to the capital
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market. A third argument is an external revenue stream that makes it protable
to give away the main product for free. Furthermore, the authors expect that open
source software brings down revenues of closed source software and I will also
discuss whether that is true in this framework.
To use the network type model for general software one of course has to discuss
how a network is built in the model. For the operating systems it is clear that the
network is software that is written and sold for the respective system. This gives
additional utility for consumer and this is greater the greater the network size is.
This is also true for other types of software like middleware as it is the basis for
other software. A more abstract and general notion of network is to assume that
the network property holds true also for other types of software, due to learning
eects, "private support" by other users or complementary products like other
software or documentation. Communication software is also more useful the more
people use the software (like the general telephone network). I assume here that
this is the case for any software I discuss. Certainly, dierent types of software
have dierent degrees of network eects and for some this might be negligible. A
detailed discussion of those features of software would of course need a separate
study and is not part of this work.
The idea to make software open source software whenever the product would not
be protable of course is just one of many ideas to justify open source but it is one
that is consistent with the revenue maximizing assumption in economic theory.
Using the same model as the one for operating systems licensing, I assume that
the products now are software packages that have a distinct quality. Note further
that there is no second rm that makes decisions on entry and prices but only a
software package with quality s that is available to the consumers at p2 = 0.






that case there are three dierent equilibria in stage 3 that lead to dierent consu-
mer equilibria in stage 4: For low values of N1 the open source product takes over
the full market and for high values the open source product is not sold at all. In
between the market is shared between the incumbent and the open source software
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and the full market is served in all three equilibria:
1. N1  1: (p1; p2) = (0; 0), (z1; z2) = (0; 1)
2. 1 < N1 <
2s 3 2

: (p1; p2) = (
N1 
2





3. N1  2s 3 2 : (p1; p2) = (N1   s+  + 1; 0), (z1; z2) = (1; 0)
The equilibrium when rm 2 does not release the software as open source but enters
the market in stage 2 is equivalent to the one for the operating systems licensing
case. Comparing the price vectors for the open source strategy and the market




and equal if N1  2s 3 2 .
Proof. The condition for open source is the same as the market entry condition
from the licensing case above. If rm 2 cannot protably enter the market in stage
2 then releasing the software as open source also maximizes prots to zero33. In
stage 3 rm 1 can choose between prices that lead to equilibria 1b, 2b and 3b in
the consumer stage given that p2 = holds. The optimal price for the quadratic
revenue function for the 1b equilibrium is p1 =
N1 
2
. As p1  0 has to hold the
optimal price however is p1 = 0 if N1  1 (3b). Furthermore, if N1  2s 3 2 then
the maximum is in the range of the 2b equilibrium and it is therefore optimal to
choose the border value at p1 = N1   s +  + 1 (2b). This 2b equilibrium is the
same as the one from the licensing case. If 1 < N1 <
2s 3 2





(1b). Comparing prices clearly shows that both p1 and p2 are
always smaller than when rm enters the market.
33I assume that licensing is not an option. If it was then either N1  s 2 or F1  (N1+s)
2
4(s )  
N1    has to hold also such that the rm is not better o by using conventional licensing.
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5.5. Open Source: Signaling Incentives
Using signaling incentives in the model requires a change in perception of the se-
cond rm which now does not have the goal to necessarily maximize revenues but
has other incentives like future job opportunities and access to capital market. In
this case it is probably useful to not think of rm 2 as a standard rm but rather
a private initiative, a research group at a university, a small startup or a hobby
programmer. Lerner and Tirole show that this is a very common way how open
source products start it's business (Lerner and Tirole, 2002). The crucial assump-
tion I make is that those signaling incentives are maximized when the network
of the product (or the number of buyers) are maximized for rm 2. The hypo-
thesis behind this is that job signaling and capital market signaling are optimal
whenever the product awareness is maximized and this is done by maximizing the
network.
If in stage 1 the decision is made for open source licensing then p2 = 0 which leads
to the same stage 3 and 4 equilibria as in the market entry case. The benchmark
however is not the prot maximizing case but the case where the entrant maximizes
z2 in stage 3 and not the prot, given that at least the entry cost F2 can be
earned:
Proposition 10. If rm 2 maximizes the network size instead of revenues in stage
3 then for a low N1 rm 2 can set a positive price and earn positive revenues by
taking over the full market while the other two equilibria are the same as above
(market entry). Therefore, both N1  1 and F2   N1+ have to hold such that
entry is possible. Prices in the open source case are again smaller as rm 2 has
to set a positive price when entering the market. To formalize the pricing stage
equilibria:
1. N1  1: (p1; p2) = (0; N1 + ), (z1; z2) = (0; 1)
2. 1 < N1 <
2s 3 2

: (p1; p2) = (
N1 
2
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3. N1  2s 3 2 : (p1; p2) = (N1   s+  + 1; 0), (z1; z2) = (1; 0)
Proof. Maximizing z2 in stage 3 leads to either p2 = 0 or p2 > 0 whenever z2 = 1
already holds. The latter happens when p2 =  N1+  and then for any p1 > 0 a
3b consumer equilibrium is played which already maximizes z2. Of course N1  1
has to hold as p2  0. This is the rst equilibrium for N1  1. If N1 > 1 network
maximization is done by setting p2 = 0 and the equilibria are the same as the ones
for the market entry case. Clearly, in case of signaling incentives entering is not
optimal when N1 > 1 because for F2 > 0 the prot is negative while it is zero in
the open source case. If N1  1 then for F2   N1 +  the prot for market
entry is non-negative such that open source is not optimal in that case.
Remark: The conditions for entry mean that both N1 and F2 have to be quite
small which is equivalent to saying that entry has to be easy. In that case a
private initiative or a startup might enter the market with it's superior product
but whenever entry is harder then open source is the way to go.
5.6. Open Source: External Revenue
The third aspect about open source is that rms can earn o open source software
by oering service contracts, additional software and services. This is the route
many open source companies go and it also ts the strategy Google is using: Google
oers software and services for free (not always open source though) and makes
money by selling advertising. The idea behind this is that selling advertising leads
to a higher prot than selling the actual product. Of course, a company could both
sell the commercial software and use advertising as well but this is not common
and might be rejected by consumers.
To model this strategy I assume that in stage 1 rm 2 can opt to enter the market
in a conventional way and compete or release it as open source. This enforces
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p2 = 0 but rm 2 still gets revenues of 2 = z2. The assumption is that the prot
is linearly increasing with the network size and  is the prot per network size.
Proposition 11. If rm 2 makes it's development open source then rm 2 takes
over the full market if rm 1's existing network is low, it has to share the market
for intermediate values and cannot enter for high values N1. Formally, the stage 3
equilibria look like this:
1. N1  1: (p1; p2) = (0; 0), (z1; z2) = (0; 1)
2. 1 < N1 <
2s 3 2

: (p1; p2) = (
N1 
2





3. N1  2s 3 2 : (p1; p2) = (N1   s+  + 1; 0), (z1; z2) = (1; 0)
Proof. The proof is equivalent to the rst part if Proposition 9 as again p2 = 0 and
rm 1 optimizes prots given that price. The dierence between those two cases
is that rm 2's revenues are not zero.
Proposition 12. Open Source is an optimal strategy for rm 2 if the external
revenue parameter  is large enough to compensate for the zero price. The condi-
tions are   2( N1+2s 3 2)
9
  F2 2(s  1) N1+2s 3 2 for maxfN1; 1g < N1 <
2s 3 2

and   ( N1+2s 3 2)2
9(s 2 1)  F2 for N1  N1  1 and N1 < 1. This includes the case
where rm 2 could not enter the market anyways.
Proof. The last argument can be shown easily by using the same proof as in Pro-
position 9: When the alternative (enter the market) does not oer positive prots
then open source is at least as good a strategy for rm 2. Comparing the mar-
ket entry condition from Proposition 6 (F2  ( N1+2s 3 2)29(s 2 1) ) to the conditions
from above shows that those are always fullled for any   0 when the market
entry condition is not met. The conditions stated above can be derived by com-
paring the prot functions for the two cases. For open source those prots are
2 =  for N1  1, 2 =  N1+2s 3 22(s 2 1) for 1 < N1 < 2s 3 2 and 2 = 0 for
N1  2s 3 2 . For market entry the prots are 2 =  F2 for N1  2s 3 2 and
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2 =
( N1+2s 3 2)2
9(s 2 1) )   F2 for N1  N1 < 2s 3 2 . The comparisons lead to the
conditions shown above for the dierent ranges of N1.
Note that there is again no result for N1 < N1 because then there is no pure
strategy equilibrium in case of entry (duopoly situation in stage 3) and therefore
no benchmark value. The results show that open source can be optimal from a
prot standpoint even when rm 2 could enter the market and earn a positive
prot. This is due to two eects: By releasing the software as open source the
software is more interesting for consumers than it would be otherwise which leads
to a higher market share and higher prots. The second eect is that the rm also
does not have to pay the entry cost. Depending on the other parameters  can
therefore be a lot smaller than the competitive price for rm 2 and still make open
source optimal.
5.7. Other Topics and Remarks
The last sections showed some of the topics that can be discussed using the de-
veloped model. However, there are many more related topics that could have also
been discussed but the scope of this work has to be limited to a certain extent.
Here, I want to just shortly show and discuss some of those topics:
Related to the licensing topic is the topic about smartphone systems and the
system competition that started a few years ago and is still ongoing (see above).
One could assume Apple as the incumbent and Google's Android system as the
entrant. However, there are a few dierences to the operating systems case, most
notably that Apple is probably still the technological leader and that Google is
also using an open source strategy. This would need a model with qualities s2 < s1
and p2 = 0.
Another topic that can be analyzed is the current \codec war" between the closed
MPEG codecs and Google's open WebM format. The network in this case is the
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number of videos coded in a certain format which gives utility to the consumers.
Codecs are of course not directly sold to consumers but are installed in media
players or web browsers that consumers install. Again, in this situation s2 < s1
and p2 = 0 has to hold.
One of the topics of openness that was completely neglected was the issue of com-
patibility. This touches the topics of middleware products which enforce software
compatibility of the underlying operating systems because software can always
run on any system. Clearly, this could be analyzed by using the operating systems
licensing approach and compare the equilibria with and without middleware. Ho-
wever, this is part of a general topic that is already discussed in the literature a
lot (see related work) and therefore the other topics seem more interesting for this
work.
The overall analysis however lacks a few aspects that I want to mention here and
that could be a starting point for future work:
• I already stated that the analysis for open source is hardly complete by just
implementing some dierent incentives and revenues into a model. Note also
that in this type of model there is no distinction between open source or free
software. For all those incentives providing the software for free is as good
as providing it as open source. Open source however seems to have more
benets both for the developer and for the consumers.
• The analysis of licensing is somewhat incomplete whenever the competing
companies act in vertically integrated markets as is the case in the App-
le/Microsoft story.
• The model is not solved in a general way but for certain parameter combi-
nations and the model further allows for more complex setups, for example
using dierent network parameters for dierent rms (maybe a way to go in
the open source discussion) and using dierent ranges of parameter values.
The model was solved for combinations that keep the possible pricing stage
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equilibria at a minimum and also ensure unique consumer stage equilibria.
That there is no pure strategy equilibrium for small values of N1 in the
duopoly case (stage 3) could possibly be overcome by discussing dierent
parameter ranges.
• In a more general perspective the model can be seen as a short term model
for the situation in which the game is over after one licensing and one pricing
decision. The setup of the model however could be used to play the game
repeatedly which would allow for more complex strategies and also for an
endogenous explanation of the lead of the incumbent (parameter N1).
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6. Summary, Conclusions and Possible Extensions
The thesis shows that one can indeed formulate openness as a general term for a
class of problems that can often be found especially in the sector of information
technology. This includes open source, compatibility issues and licensing. The ap-
proach to discuss the topics in general oers an interesting view and seems useful.
That openness is treated very dierently by dierent rms but also within the
rms is the result of the rst part of this thesis: While Google is open in almost
any possible way (except it's search technology), Microsoft traditionally is not.
Although becoming more open recently this has to be attributed at least to a cer-
tain extent to pressure from antitrust courts both in the US and in Europe. Apple
did not face the same pressure and has to be considered even less open in some
ways (operating system, hardware platform, iTunes, iPhone and others) although
more open in others which is shown in some open source projects to which Apple
is contributing to.
The economic analysis in the second part of the thesis shows how certain topics
can be discussed using a model that features network economics, vertical product
dierentiation and an incumbent-entrant scheme. Using it for a licensing topic
shows how licensing is often optimal whenever the incumbent faces competition
due to the entry of another company with a better technology. The same does
not hold true as strongly whenever the competitor could not enter anyways (for
example due to high entry costs) although there are some parameter combinations
that still would make licensing optimal. Using the model for open source issues
one can show how certain incentives that are mentioned in the literature lead
to situations where open source is optimal for the potential entrant: Whenever
entry would not be protable, whenever there are signaling incentives involved
and whenever there is an external source of revenue for the rm.
The thesis however only covers a small subset of issues and topics that can be
discussed, to mention only a few more: Compatibility was not discussed in that
setup and there is also the topic of standards that was neglected. For several other
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topics a more sophisticated model would be useful and a few suggestions were
made in the last section. I also only discussed the abstractions and assumptions of
the model in a rather basic form and a detailed study about the industry possibly
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A.1. Proof: Uniqueness of Equilibria in Consumer Stage
Equilibrium 4: Equilibrium 4 is unique as it has a unique price range where
no other equilibrium is possible. Therefore, if a price vector (p1; p2) is a type 4
equilibrium, no other equilibrium is possible which means that a type 4 equilibrium
is always unique.
Equilibrium 1a: By inspection of Table 1 one can immediately notice that equi-
libria 1b, 2a and 3a are impossible for the same price vector (p1; p2) constituting
a type 1a equilibrium due to the mutually exclusive price restrictions and that a
3b type is not possible due to the dierent price ranges.
This leaves type 2b as the only possibility to make a type 1a equilibrium non-unique
because it has both an overlapping price and a dierent price restriction. For 2b
p2  p1   N1 + s  1   has to hold and for 1a p2 < 11 p1   1 N1 + s  11  .
If a single price vector (p1; p2) constitutes both a 1a and 2b type equilibrium
p1   N1 + s   1    < 11 p1   1 N1 + s   11  has to hold for a feasible p1.
However, solving the inequality for p1 leads to p1 > N1+ which is not a feasible
p1 for type 2b which requires p1  N1+. Therefore, there is no valid combination
of (p1; p2) that leads to both a 1a and 2b equilibrium which means that also a type
1a equilibrium is always unique.
Equilibrium 1b: Types 1a and 4 can already be excluded due to the analysis
from above. Types 2b and 3b mutually exclusive price restrictions with type 1b
and 2a has a dierent price range. For 3a and 1b to happen for the same price
vector p1 N1+ < (s )p1 (s )N1+ has to hold for a feasible p1 such
that the price restrictions for both types are met. Solving the inequality leads to
p1 > N1 which is outside the price region for type 1b and therefore a type 1b
equilibrium is also always unique.
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Equilibrium 2a: Again, types 1a, 1b and 4 can already be excluded. 2b has a
dierent price range and the same is true for 3b as s   1 is greater than  for
s > + 1
1  . For 2a and 3a to happen for the same prices
1
1 p1  1 N1+ s  1+

1   (s )p1 (s )N1+ has to hold for a feasible p1. For s > + 11  the
inequality solves to p1  N1+1 which is not a feasible price for 2a and therefore
this type is also always unique.
Equilibrium 2b: Here, 3a and 3b both cannot be ruled out immediately so an
analysis of the price restrictions for both pairs is necessary. To have both 2b and 3a
together for the same price vector p1 N1+s 1   (s )p1 (s )N1+
has to hold and this leads to p1  N1 + s 2 1s  1 . For s >  + 11  this is always
greater than N1 +  and therefore out of the range for equilibrium 2b.
To have both 2b and 3b p1   N1 + s  1    p1   N1 +  has to hold which
leads to s   2   1  0 which is impossible for s >  + 1
1  . The 2b equilibrium
is therefore also always unique.
Equilibrium 3a: The only non-unique equilibrium left is 3b but this has a dierent
price range than the 3a equilibrium and therefore a type 3a equilibrium is also
always unique.
Equilibrium 3b: The type 3b equilibrium has to be also unique as all the others
are.
Summary: This shows that the equilibria are indeed unique whenever s > + 1
1  .
The proof further shows that the uniqueness of the consumer stage equilibria are
only dependent on the values of s and  but independent of N1. Therefore, the
uniqueness property would not change if one switched the system qualities to for




A.2 Proof: Price Equilibria in Duopoly A APPENDIX
A.2. Proof: Price Equilibria in Duopoly
A price vector (p1; p2) is an equilibrium if one price is optimal given the price of the
other rm and vice versa. Optimal means that no other price gives a higher prot
(equal to revenue as variable costs are zero) for that rm. However, the situation is
complicated due to the fact that a given price vector leads to a consumer equilibri-
um in the next stage and hence changing the price in this stage might also change
the equilibrium type in the next stage. The best way to show the equilibria in this
stage is to assume a consumer equilibrium to be played in stage 4 and to nd price
equilibrium candidates that lead to that consumer equilibrium. For this purpose
it is important to note that the combined revenue functions of all the equilibria in
the respective price ranges are always continuous. This is intuitive and a proof is
given in the next section of this appendix.
Proposition 13. It is never optimal to choose a price vector that leads to a con-
sumer equilibrium 4 (no system is sold).
Proof. Such a price vector has to satisfy p2  s and p1  N1 + 1 and then the
networks and revenues are zero for both rms (see Table 1). However, given the
price of the other rm, rm 1 can always set a price to select equilibria 2a or 2b to
earn a positive revenue and rm 2 can select equilibria 3a and 3b. Therefore, it is
not optimal for either rm to stick to a price such that an equilibrium 4 is played
in the next stage.
Proposition 14. It is also never optimal to choose a price vector that leads to
consumer equilibria 2a and 3a (Only one rm sells system but not the full market
is served).
Proof. For a 2a equilibrium rm 2 has no revenues and p2  11 p1  1 N1+s 1 

1  > s 1 > 0 has to hold. However, by setting p2 < 11 p1  1 N1+s 1  1 
rm 2 can force a 1a equilibrium to be played for which the revenue for rm
2 is positive because as p2 > s   1 that critical value is always positive. The
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situation is the same for the 3a equilibrium for which rm 1 can always set p1 <
1
s p2 + N1   s  as 1s p2 + N1   s  > N1 > 0.
Proposition 15. There is a price equilibrium in stage 3 that leads to a 2b con-
sumer equilibrium in stage 4. In that case, p2 = z2 = 2 = 0 and p1 = 1 =
N1   s+  + 1; z1 = 1 for N1  2s 3 2 . No other equilibrium that leads to a 2b
consumer equilibrium is possible.
Proof. As rm 2 does not earn any revenues in this equilibrium the price setting
for rm 2 can only be optimal if for any other feasible price p2 the revenue is
non-positive given the price of rm 1. Clearly, a higher price p2 > 0 does not
lead to a higher revenue as it still leads to a 2b consumer equilibrium when p1 =
N1 s++1 (Table 1). The price restriction for the 2b equilibrium then turns to
p2  0 and as consumer equilibria are unique the only possible equilibrium to be
played for any price p2 has to be the 2b equilibrium. A lower price p2 < 0 of course
is also not possible as prices have to be non-negative. The situation is therefore
optimal for rm 2 as it cannot do better by choosing any other price.
The situation is also optimal for rm 1: Given p2 = 0 rm 1 can set a price such
that either equilibria 1b, 2b or 3b are played in stage 4. 3b can never be better than
2b for rm 1 as then the revenue is zero. Note also that given a 2b equilibrium
is played in stage 4 rm 1 cannot do better by choosing a dierent price that
also leads to a 2b equilibrium: p1 = N1   s +  + 1 is the maximum feasible
price such that a 2b equilibrium will be played and lowering the price would not
make sense because the full market is served already. The revenue such that a 1b
equilibrium is played is 1 =
 p1+N1 
s 2 1 p1 and optimizing this quadratic function
leads to p1 =
N1 
2
. As the combined revenue function for rm 1 for equilibria
1b and 2b is continuous, playing 2b is only optimal if N1 
2
 N1   s + 1 + 
and this is the case if N1  2s 3 2 . In that case the maximizing price for the 1b
equilibrium is outside of it's range and therefore it is optimal to play the border
value which is the 2b equilibrium.. Therefore, this price vector and the restriction
on N1 form an equilibrium in stage 3. Note also that p1 = N1   s +  + 1 > 0
holds when N1  2s 3 2 .
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If there was another equilibrium (p1; p2) that would lead to a 2b equilibrium in
the next stage then p2 = p > 0 would have to hold. However, in that case also
p1 = p+N1 s++1 > N1 s++1 had to hold to make it an optimal choice
for rm 1. In this case rm 2 could set p2 < p to make a positive revenue because
then consumers would play a 1b equilibrium as then p2 < p1   N1   s +  + 1
(see Table 1). This shows that no other price equilibrium leading to a 2b consumer
equilibrium is possible.
Proposition 16. There is further no price equilibrium that leads to a 3b consumer
equilibrium (rm 2 takes over the full market).
Proof. The situation is similar to the proof above such that the only equilibrium
candidate is p1 = 0 and p2 =  N1 + . In that case rm 2 plays the maximum
possible price for the 3b equilibrium (maximizing revenue) and rm 1 cannot
choose a dierent p1 > 0 such that it gets a positive revenue. However, doing
a similar analysis as above, the revenue function for the 1b equilibrium for rm 2
is 2 =
 p2 N1+s  1
s 2 1 p2 which maximizes at p2 =
 N1+s  1
2
. Due to the same
reasoning as above playing a price that leads to this 3b equilibrium is only better
than the optimal 1b equilibrium price if  N1+s  1
2
  N1 +  which leads
to the condition N1  1+3 s < 0 as s >  + 11  > 1 + 3 for  > 12 . As by
assumption N1 > 0 no price equilibrium can exist such that this 3b equilibrium is
played in stage 4.
Proposition 17. There is also no price vector that leads to a 1a consumer equi-
librium (market sharing without serving the full market).
Proof. The revenue function for rm 1 in this case is 1 =
p2 (s )p1+(s )N1 
(s )(1 ) 1 p1





N1   2(s ) . Comparing that optimal





N1  2(s ) < s  1p2+N1  
2
s  1 leads to p2 < +
(s )(s  1)
(s )(1 2) 1N1 <  for
 > 1
2
and s > + 1
1  . p2 <  however is not possible for any equilibrium type 1a
as shown in the price range. Firm 1 would therefore always choose a price outside
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of the 1a price range as an optimal price, for example the border price between 1a
and 1b.
Proposition 18. A price vector leading to a 1b consumer equilibrium is possible
for N1  N1 < 2s 3 2 . The price vector is (p1; p2) = (N1+s 3 13 ;  N1+2s 3 23 )
and this is always an interior solution in the sense that values at the border to 1a
are never played. Furthermore, (s 3 1)
2
(2s 3 2)  N1  s 3 12 holds.
Proof. Using a similar analysis as above one can derive the optimal prices for












. The crossing point of those two functions leads to the price vector
shown in the proposition which is an equilibrium candidate as long as it meets the




p1   (s      1)N1 +  by combining it with the two optimal prices.
This price is optimal for the two rms if the maximum of both revenue functions
of the 1a and 1b consumer equilibria are right at the border to 1a or even cross it.
If this is not the case then either playing a price in 1a or an "interior\ price in 1b
is optimal for one of the two rms.
Checking the functions for rm 2 shows that this is not the case. To be optimal
to play the border function the following inequalities have to hold (from the price
restrictions): p1a2 =
1




p1  12N1+ s  12  s  1 p1  (s  1)N1+. This is optimal if for
the price of rm 1 N1 + 
s 3 1
2s 3 2  p1  N1 +  (s 2)(1 ) 12(1 )(s  1)  holds and then
s 3 1
2s 3 2  (s 2)(1 ) 12(1 )(s  1)  is a necessary condition. Solving the inequality however
leads to s  1 which contradicts the assumption s > + 1
1  > 1. There is therefore
no price p1 such that a vector (p1; p2) where the border price is played is optimal
for rm 2. Therefore, an equilibrium always has to be an interior equilibrium.





) is certainly optimal
inside the range of 1b but depending on the actual values N1 both rms also have
the option to choose prices such that another consumer equilibrium is played in
stage 4. The analysis is quite complex and I discuss the dierent situations in 4
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steps, splitting the price ranges for both rms:
0  p2   , 2s 6 2  N1  2s 3 2 :
In this case rm 1 has the alternatives to choose equilibria 2b and 3b instead of
1b. 3b of course can never be better (zero revenue) but 2b could. Using the result
from the analysis of the 2b equilibrium from above shows that playing the 1b
equilibrium is optimal if N1 <
2s 3 2

which is consistent with 0  p2  .
 < p2 < s  1,  s 3+1 < 0 < N1 < 2s 6 2 :
The alternatives in this case are 1a, 2b and 3a. The zero revenue type 3a cannot




case here. Furthermore, the 1a consumer equilibrium always oers less revenues
than the 1b equilibrium as the optimal price crosses the border to 1b (see proof
of inexistence of 1a price equilibrium). Of course, p1  s  1p2 + N1   
2
s  1
has to hold as well as otherwise it is optimal for rm 1 to just play the border
price which does not lead to any equilibrium (see above). Using p1 and p2 for
this inequality leads to N1  (s 3 1)2(2s 3 2) > 0. Playing this equilibrium candidate is
therefore always optimal for rm 1 as long as (s 3 1)
2
(2s 3 2)  N1 < 2s 3 2 holds.
0  p1  N1 , N1  s 3 12 :
Here, the alternatives for rm 1 are 2b and 3b which makes it similar to the rst
analysis above. 2b cannot improve the revenue while 3b potentially can. However,
doing a similar analysis to the one above shows that 1b is better than 3b for rm
2 if N1 >
 s 3+1

which is negative, hence, for any N1  s 3 12 .
N1 < p1 < N1 +  , s 6 12 < N1 < s 3 12 :
In this case the alternatives are 1a, 2b, 3a and 3b. 2b (zero revenue) and 3b (see
above) can already be ruled out as better options. Furthermore, as was already
shown in the analysis above, N1  (s 3 1)2(2s 3 2 > 0 has to hold because otherwise





holds for s > 1 the
upper bound of the price region (N1 + ) is not an issue. The situation for the
combined revenue function is rather complex as 1a, 1b and 3a all have quadratic
revenue functions in their regions.
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The optimal price for a 3a type equilibrium is p2 =
s
2
and the price restric-







as it would need N1  s 3 12   3(s 2)4(s ) < (s 3 1)
2
(2s 3 2) .
This means that for the N1 in question and p1 from the equilibrium candida-
te rm 2 cannot set it's optimal price for a 3a equilibrium but the best it can
do is to set the border price to 1b. Firm 1 can further play the optimal 1a pri-
ce p2 =
1
2(1 )p1   12(1 )N1 + s s 12(1 ) in that region or play the border price
between 1a and 3a: p2 = (s   )p1   (s   )N1 + . In this situation revenue
functions have to be compared directly and playing the equilibrium candidate






(1 )[(s )(1 ) 1] (1b vs. 1a) and
(2s 3 2 N1)2
9(s 3 1)  (s  1)(s 3)+ 2(s )N13 2N1 s+3+43 (1b vs. 3a). Unfortunately,
the second inequality cannot be solved in generality for N1
34. However, the above
analysis shows that the lower bound for the region of N1 where a 1b equilibrium





] which denes N1.
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A.3. Proof: Continuity of Revenue Functions in Pricing Stage
To show the continuity of the revenue functions one has to show that at the border
between two consumer equilibria the revenues are equal. As the prices are the same
at the border this is equivalent to showing that the networks are equal. This is
clear intuitively when having in mind how the stage 4 equilibria are constructed.
Using Table 1 this leads to the following combinations:
1. The 1a equilibrium has a border to the 1b equilibrium which is at p2 =
s  1

p1  (s   1)N1+. Plugging it into z2 (and the equivalent one into
z1) for both equilibrium types 1a and 1b leads to z
1a




+N1 + 1 = z
1b
2 .




1 N1 + s  11  which leads to z1a1 =  p2 + s = z2a1 and z1a2 = 0 = z2a2 .
3. Another border can be found to the 3a equilibrium at p2 = (s )p1 (s 
)N1 +  and then z
1a




2 =  p1 + N1 + 1 = z3a2 .
4. There is also a border between 1b and 2b at p2 = p1   N1 + s      1
and one to 3b at p2 = p1   N1 +  and those lead to z1b1 = 1 = z2b1 and








2 = 1 = z
3b
2 .
Therefore: At each border between two consumer equilibria the network functions
are continuous and therefore also the revenue functions.
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A.4. Abstract
This master thesis scrutinizes the topic of openness, a generalization of many
important subtopics, in information technology and it's economic properties. Ex-
amples of subtopics that are included in the denition of openness are open source,
compatibility, standards, interfaces and licensing. The work is structured into two
major parts: In the rst one a study is done about the history and strategy with a
focus on openness about Microsoft, Apple and Google, three of the most import-
ant companies in information technology. This study shows that those strategies
are quite dierent but also changed over time. While Microsoft adopted a closed
approach that opened up a little in recent years (partly because of pressure from
competition authorities) Google always relied on openness with the exception of
it's most important technology: It's search algorithm. Apple is in many ways even
more closed than Microsoft, although it seems to be more open with respect to
open source, especially when it improves the quality of it's own products. In the
second part of this work an economic model is developed which includes network
economics, vertical product dierentiation and an incumbent-entrant-scheme with
economies of scale. In this 4-stage model with 2 companies it is possible to dis-
cuss certain aspects of competition and openness in this industry and this is done
with applications of operating systems licensing and some economic aspects and
incentives of open source (impossible market entry, signaling incentives, external
revenues). The results are dependent on the chosen model parameters but some
general results can be shown nevertheless: That licensing is most likely optimal
whenever market entry by the second rm is possible and that an open source stra-
tegy indeed makes sense when the discussed aspects and incentives hold true.
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A.5. Abstract - German
Die vorliegende Diplomarbeit widmet sich dem Thema Oenheit ("openness\) in
der Informationstechnik und untersucht dazu okonomische Zusammenhange und
Gesetzmaigkeiten. Oenheit ist hier als Verallgemeinerung anderer Themen zu
sehen, unter anderem Open Source, Kompatibilitat, Standards, Schnittstellen und
Lizensierung. Die Arbeit ist dabei in zwei wesentliche Teile gegliedert:
Im ersten Teil geht es um eine Aufarbeitung der Geschichte und Strategie mit
besonderem Fokus auf Oenheit von Microsoft, Apple und Google, drei der wich-
tigsten und erfolgreichsten Unternehmen im Bereich der Informationstechnik. Da-
bei zeigt sich, dass die Strategien sehr unterschiedlich sind, sich aber auch im
Zeitablauf andern. Wahrend Microsoft traditionell auf Geschlossenheit setzt und
sich erst in den letzten Jahren teilweise durch Druck von Wettbewerbsbehorden
etwas onete (Oenlegung von Schnittstellen, Lizensierung von Technologie, Ak-
zeptanz von Open Source) ist Google ein von Anfang an oenes Unternehmen,
welches nur in Ausnahmenfallen geschlossene Systeme verwendet, dies aber dann
bei der wichtigsten Technologie, dem Such-Algorithmus. Apple ist in vielen Be-
reichen noch geschlossener als Microsoft, in anderen wie zum Beispiel aber Open
Source durchaus aufgeschlossen wenn es der eigenen Produktqualitat nutzt.
Im zweiten Teil der Arbeit geht es um die Darstellung der beobachteten Zusam-
menhange in einem okonomischen Modell. Dieses vereint Netzwerkokonomie, ver-
tikale Produktdierenzierung und ein Incumbent-Entrant-Schema mit fallenden
Durchschnittskosten. In diesem 4-Phasen-Modell konnen verschiedene Aspekte des
Themas dargestellt werden, wobei exemplarisch die Lizensierung eines Betriebs-
systems und gewisse Aspekte von Open Source aus der Literatur (unmoglicher
Markteintritt, Signalisierungsanreize, externe Umsatze) beleuchtet werden. Die je-
weiligen Resultate hangen letztlich von den gewahlten Parametern ab, es zeigt sich
aber, dass Lizensierung vor allem dann sinnvoll ist wenn es zu einem Markteintritt
kommen wurde und dass unter den vorgeschlagenen Annahmen Open-Source fur
ein potenziell in den Markt eintretendes Unternehmen durchaus Sinn macht.
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